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DRAWING TRUMP NAKED: CURBING THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY TO PROTECT PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
THOMAS E. KADRI* 
 From Donald Trump to Lindsay Lohan to Manuel Noriega, real 
people who are portrayed in expressive works are increasingly tar-
geting creators of those works for allegedly violating their “right 
of publicity”—a state-law tort that prohibits the unauthorized use 
of a person’s name, likeness, and other identifying characteristics.  
Intuitively, we might feel confident that Mark Zuckerberg should 
not be able to block his portrayal in The Social Network movie, 
that Marilyn Monroe could not have stopped Andy Warhol from 
exhibiting his vibrant paintings, that O.J. Simpson could not have 
demanded money from FX to air the American Crime Story docu-
drama.  But what supports these intuitions?  And should we be so 
confident? 
 This Article provides a new framework to reconcile publicity 
rights with a robust commitment to free speech under the First 
Amendment.  After describing the current landscape in the courts, 
this Article scrutinizes the “educative” First Amendment theory 
that has motivated many of the past decisions confronting the right 
of publicity—a listener-focused theory that relies on the public’s 
right to receive information.  This Article then reframes the doc-
trine in a new way: as four distinct educative defenses that have 
developed to assuage concerns about publicity rights interfering 
with speech on matters of public concern.  These four defenses 
might seem encouraging to those who worry that publicity rights 
impair expressive rights.  But all too often they have instead com-
plicated and undermined the opposition to publicity rights and, as 
a result, they pose an unexpected and underestimated threat to free 
speech.  To combat this threat, this Article recalibrates First 
Amendment theory as it relates to the right of publicity. 
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 To adequately protect creators and their expressive works, this 
Article argues that we must abandon educative models of the First 
Amendment and instead adopt an approach that also protects the 
speaker as a central part of enabling public discourse.  Failure to 
adopt this speaker-focused theory in publicity doctrine will perpet-
uate confusion in the courts and state legislatures, an outcome that 
will have a chilling effect on creators who seek to portray real peo-
ple in their work.  Yet we must also recognize the interests that 
publicity rights can serve.  As we move into an era of new technol-
ogy and innovation—from “deep fakes” to nonconsensual pornog-
raphy—this challenge will only intensify.  To address it, courts 
should refer to the constitutional concept of “public discourse” 
when publicity rights face off against expressive rights—a concept 
that not only empowers free expression, but also considers the nar-
row interests that we should all have in preventing certain uses of 
our images. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the months before the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump had 
more than polling numbers on his mind.  While Trump wooed crowds with 
his promise to restore national greatness, painter Illma Gore depicted the fu-
ture president in a nude and unflattering portrait aptly titled Make America 
Great Again.1  Her goal was to highlight “the significance we place on our 
                                                          
 1.  Claire Voon, The Donald Threatens to Sue Artist over Her Trump Micropenis Portrait, 
HYPERALLERGIC (Apr. 20, 2016), https://hyperallergic.com/292436/the-donald-threatens-to-sue-
artist-over-her-trump-micropenis-portrait/. 
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physical selves” and challenge the idea that appearance defines “your ability, 
your power, or your status.”2  But when images of the portrait went viral, 
Trump’s legal team threatened to sue Gore for painting him without his per-
mission.3 
Trump’s dispute with Gore is part of a growing trend.  In recent years, 
creators of expressive works4 have faced legal challenges brought by a bi-
zarre cast of characters, including Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega,5 
Mexican drug lord “El Chapo” Guzmán,6 wayward actress Lindsey Lohan,7 
and Hollywood dame Olivia de Havilland.8  What have these creators done 
to provoke litigation?  They portrayed real people.  After releasing documen-
taries, songs, paintings, films, or videogames, they were accused of violating 
someone’s “right of publicity”—a state-law tort that prohibits the unauthor-
ized use of a person’s name, likeness, and other identifying characteristics.9 
                                                          
 2.  Interview with Illma Gore, Artist & Creator, Making America Great Again, in New Haven, 
Conn. (Feb. 19, 2018). 
 3.  Voon, supra note 1; see Patrick Greenfield, Artist Threatened with Lawsuits If She Sells 
Nude Donald Trump Painting, GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/apr/17/nude-donald-trump-painting-illma-gore-lawsuits. 
 4.  I use the term “creators” here because, for my purposes, it comes closest to capturing the 
diverse set of actors involved in producing and distributing expressive works—from movie-makers 
to singers to documentarians to journalists to YouTubers.  Defining what constitutes an “expressive 
work” is, at times, a vexing task.  It is ultimately a construct shaped by social practice, and any 
definition must capture any medium of expression that we commonly use to communicate ideas and 
opinions.  When I use the term “expressive works,” I mean to capture not only the more traditional 
forms of news and entertainment media—such as paintings, books, newspapers, movies, documen-
taries, music, and photography—but also those media of a more recent vintage—such as video-
games, memes, and Tweets—that now serve as vehicles for so much of our public discourse.  See 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (discussing First Amendment protection 
of some expressive works); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, 
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 169 (1995). 
 5.  Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *1 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) (suing the makers of the Call of Duty videogame for portraying him “as an an-
tagonist and as the culprit of numerous fictional heinous crimes”). 
 6.  Dolia Estevez, Do Univision and Netflix Have to Pay Drug Lord ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán to 
Air His Life Story?, FORBES (June 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaeste-
vez/2016/06/01/do-univision-and-netflix-have-to-pay-drug-lord-el-chapo-guzman-to-air-his-life-
story/#af177385f224 (reporting on Guzmán’s plan to sue the makers of a television series because 
they recounted his life story and used his nickname without his permission and without compensat-
ing him). 
 7.  Litigious Lohan tried and failed twice.  See Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 
97 N.E.3d 389, 392 (N.Y. 2018) (suing the creators of the Grand Theft Auto V videogame because 
it featured a “blonde woman . . . wearing a red bikini and bracelets, taking a ‘selfie’ with her cell 
phone, and displaying the peace sign with one of her hands”); Lohan v. Perez, 924 F. Supp. 2d 447, 
451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (suing the rapper Pitbull after he sang that he was “tiptoein’, to keep 
flowin’ . . . got it locked up like Lindsay Lohan”).  
 8.  De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 630–31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
(suing the producers of the docudrama Feud for portraying 101-year-old actress Olivia de Havil-
land). 
 9.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.050 (West 2017) (representing an archetypal 
publicity statute). 
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Concern about the right of publicity has not been driven merely by an 
uptick in litigation.  In response to new technologies, scholars have renewed 
their interest in this area10 and state legislatures across the country have been 
debating laws that could alter existing protections for expressive works.11  
Courts, too, have seen a slew of high-profile cases that pit publicity rights 
against expressive rights in ways that have been complicated by emerging 
technologies.12  Some commentators have encouraged steps to prevent the 
“extravagant”13 right of publicity from being a “bloated monster” that imper-
ils free speech,14 while others have argued for broader publicity rights that 
would place greater limits on portrayals of real people.15  Either future could 
come to pass: absent meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court,16 lower 
courts have been experimenting with a variety of confusing and contradictory 
tests to reconcile these competing visions.17  The circuit split is deepening,18 
the petitions for certiorari are piling up,19 and federal courts are even asking 
                                                          
 10.  See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A 
PUBLIC WORLD 1 (2018); Jesse Lempel, Combatting Deep Fakes Through the Right of Publicity, 
LAWFARE (Mar. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/combatting-deep-fakes-
through-right-publicity; see also Stacey Dogan, Stirring the Pot: A Response to Rothman’s Right of 
Publicity, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 321 (2019); Mark A. Lemley, Privacy, Property, and Publicity, 
117 MICH. L. REV. 1153 (2019). 
 11.  See Jacob Gershman, Critics Pounce on Proposed PRINCE Act in Minnesota, WALL ST. 
J.: L. BLOG (May 16, 2016, 2:17 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/05/16/critics-pounce-on-pro-
posed-prince-act-in-minnesota/; Jennifer E. Rothman, New York Right of Publicity Bill Resurrected 
Again, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (June 6, 2018, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/new-york-right-publicity-bill-resur-
rected-again. 
 12.  See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licens-
ing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1270–84 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 13.  Dogan, supra note 10, at 329. 
 14.  ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 7.  For additional critiques dating back over twenty years, see 
Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech 
Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 488–98 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put 
the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL J. ART., TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 35 (1998). 
 15.  See, e.g., Update on N.Y. Right of Publicity, SAG-AFTRA (June 23, 2017), 
https://www.sagaftra.org/update-ny-right-publicity (supporting the creation of post-mortem public-
ity rights). 
 16.  The Supreme Court’s only dalliance with the right of publicity came forty years ago in 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), where the Court allowed a 
publicity claim to proceed over a First Amendment defense without giving much guidance on how 
future courts should reconcile similar cases.  Id. at 574–75.  
 17.  Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1177–81 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
1448 (2016) (cataloguing the tests adopted by state and federal courts around the country); Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 14–21, Elec. Arts Inc. v. Davis, 136 S. Ct. 1448 (2016) (No. 15-424) (same). 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id.; see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). 
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their state counterparts for help with particularly difficult questions.20  It 
seems like only a matter of time before the Supreme Court addresses the right 
of publicity for the first time in over forty years.21 
In the meantime, this lingering uncertainty is problematic for free 
speech: creators of expressive works do not know where they stand, and the 
stakes are too high to take a risk because violating publicity rights has serious 
consequences.  Not only do some states criminalize the underlying conduct,22 
but plaintiffs may seek potent forms of relief to remedy violations, including 
nationwide injunctions23 and damages for emotional distress and commercial 
injuries.24  Even when creators of expressive works have prevailed in court, 
they have often had to wage costly wars to win, sometimes after years of 
litigation and multiple appeals.25  And due to state-by-state variations in the 
right of publicity and the defenses to it, the strength of expressive rights shifts 
across state lines.  This patchwork protection creates a chilling effect.26  Stuck 
in legal limbo, creators of expressive works may make their portrayals less 
                                                          
 20.  Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 884 F.3d 672, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2018), certified question ac-
cepted, 94 N.E.3d 696 (Ind. 2018) (asking the Indiana Supreme Court whether online fantasy-sports 
games may use Indiana’s “newsworthy” and “public interest” exceptions to the right of publicity to 
block a lawsuit brought by former college athletes whose names, pictures, and on-field statistics 
were used without permission). 
 21.  The United States Supreme Court last addressed the right of publicity in 1977.  See Zac-
chini, 433 U.S. at 562.  
 22.  See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2019). 
 23.  Jennifer E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, Commercial Use, and the Intellectual Property 
Quagmire, 101 VA. L. REV. 1929, 1950 (2015); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2115–16 (2017). 
 24.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 11:30–11:35 (2d ed. 
2017). 
 25.  Consider, for example, the publicity claim brought against the makers of the movie The 
Hurt Locker.  The claim was filed in a New Jersey district court in 2010, transferred to California 
district court in 2011, appealed and argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in 2013, and finally decided on appeal in 2016—nearly six years after the movie won the 
Oscar for Best Picture.  See Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 891–96 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 26.  See Dogan, supra note 10, at 327 (arguing that “the lack of a coherent normative rudder 
for the right of publicity has led courts to balance publicity and speech interests in an ad hoc manner 
that favors traditional forms of expression, penalizes uses that courts view as exploitative, and in-
evitably chills speech”). 
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realistic or refrain from including real people altogether.27  At the very least, 
anyone depicting a real person must tread carefully.28 
Against this backdrop, there have been diverse proposals to reconcile 
the First Amendment with an individual’s right to prevent others from por-
traying her.  Some scholars have focused on the theoretical justifications for 
the tort.29  They have questioned, for example, whether publicity rights actu-
ally create incentives for people to invest in their personae30 and whether we 
even want to create these incentives in the first place.31  Other scholars have 
criticized the court-created tests that purport to address competing First 
Amendment interests, often proposing new frameworks that they believe 
would strike a better balance.32  But absent from this conversation has been 
a thorough analysis of an important objection to publicity rights: restricting 
                                                          
 27.  See Thomas E. Kadri, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity Goes 2–0 
Against Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1529 (2014).  The chaotic state of pub-
licity law brings to mind Professor Lon Fuller’s list of formal criteria that law must meet.  Fuller 
catalogued various violations of his principles of legality, including “[1] a failure to publicize, or at 
least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; . . . [2] a failure to 
make rules understandable; [3] the enactment of contradictory rules; [and] . . . [4] introducing such 
frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them.”  LON L. FULLER, 
THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969).  For Fuller, “[a] total failure in any one of these [four] 
directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly 
called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can 
still be said to be one kind of contract.”  Id. at 40.  Although a law like the right of publicity cannot 
hope to establish perfect ex-ante notice of liability, the current doctrinal disarray might have tempted 
Fuller to declare many of his principles violated.  Cf. Dogan, supra note 10, at 329 (remarking that 
the right of publicity “is excessive and unpredictable, it lacks an adequate normative rationale, and 
it poses unjustifiable costs on speech and other interests”). 
 28.  See Stacey Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: Publicity as a Legal 
Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 17, 20 (Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, eds., 2014) (“[W]hile courts often rule in favor of the 
defendant on First Amendment grounds, they do so by applying murky legal standards that offer 
little certainty or comfort to parties thinking about selling a product that draws upon a celebrity 
identity.”). 
 29.  See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 178–238 (1993); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the 
Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 245 n.218 (2002). 
 30.  ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 100; Lemley, supra note 10, at 1157; see also Mark A. Lem-
ley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–
48 (2004). 
 31.  ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 101; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of 
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187–88 (2006) (“Even if ce-
lebrities [could be incentivized to invest in personae], it is not at all clear that society should want 
to encourage fame for fame’s sake.”); Madow, supra note 29, at 215–19. 
 32.  See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 138–59; Kadri, supra note 27, at 1525–31; see also 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 31, at 1217–20; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. 
The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 47 (1994); Jennifer 
E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L. J. 185, 223 (2012); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 913–30 (2003); Diane Leen-
heer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, 
You Made the Pants Too Long, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 283, 286 (2000). 
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portrayals of real people inhibits speech on matters of public concern.33  This 
Article fills that void. 
In bridging this gap, this Article reviews how courts are actually re-
sponding to this objection.  It then reframes the doctrine as four distinct de-
fenses that have developed to assuage concerns about publicity rights inter-
fering with speech on matters of public concern: (1) a constitutional 
affirmative defense to shield expressive works relating to matters of public 
concern; (2) a constitutional requirement that public-figure plaintiffs prove 
“actual malice” in order to prevail on their publicity claims; (3) state-law ex-
ceptions to the right of publicity for portrayals that are “newsworthy” or in 
the “public interest”; and (4) a method of constitutional avoidance in which 
courts narrowly construe publicity tort elements to evade certain free-speech 
concerns.  These four defenses might initially seem encouraging to those who 
worry that publicity rights impair expressive rights.  But all too often they 
have instead complicated and undermined the opposition to publicity rights 
and, as a result, they pose an unexpected and underestimated threat to free 
speech.34  This is because many courts have adopted what I call an “educa-
tive” free-speech theory to explain these defenses.  This theory focuses only 
on the listener’s interests in receiving information—not the speaker’s inter-
ests in speaking—and conditions protection for expressive works on their 
ability to “communicat[e] information to voters.”35  As a result, educative 
theory offers only parasitic protection: expressive works are protected only 
to the extent that they convey accurate information that facilitates democratic 
deliberation.36 
This Article argues that a different free-speech theory should animate 
the analysis—a theory that recognizes that an essential objective of the First 
Amendment should be to protect a speaker’s right to participate in public 
                                                          
 33.  Nearly forty years ago, Peter L. Felcher and Edward L. Rubin touched on this issue when 
discussing certain problems that publicity rights pose given that “the news and entertainment media 
frequently portray real people without authorization.”  Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Pri-
vacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (1979).  
But much has changed in the last four decades, and Felcher and Rubin’s work, while still relevant 
and influential, is ripe for reassessment.  
 34.  See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492, 494 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (denying First Amendment 
protection to play featuring performers who imitated the style and appearance of the Marx Brothers 
because the play was neither “biographical” nor “an attempt to convey information about the Marx 
Brothers themselves or about the development of their characters”). 
 35.  See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, The Right to Be 
Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1009 n.112 (2018) (citing 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 
(1965)). 
 36.  For prominent examples of educative theory, see OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE 
SPEECH (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); 
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–35 
(1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255. 
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discourse.  This right to participate in public discourse includes the right to 
create expressive works, even when those works feature real people, and the 
use of a person’s name or likeness in public discourse should rarely provide 
a basis for liability.  In critiquing educative defenses against the right of pub-
licity, this Article provides a theory to limit publicity rights that has been 
lacking in other scholarship—a theory that considers not only the interests 
underlying the tort, but also the First Amendment interests in portraying real 
people. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I introduces the tension be-
tween publicity rights and free speech.  Part II explores the four defenses 
raised when publicity rights interfere with speech on matters of public con-
cern, critiquing the educative theory that courts have adopted to limit protec-
tion for expressive works under these defenses.  Part III explains how the 
constitutional concept of public discourse offers a superior way to compre-
hend the limits of publicity rights when real people are portrayed in expres-
sive works.  Finally, Part III also discusses how courts might address some 
of today’s toughest questions in this area, including issues raised by new 
technologies such as “deep fake” videos, nonconsensual pornography, and 
realistic videogames. 
I. WHAT’S THE PROBLEM? 
The right of publicity may scarcely appear on a first-year Torts syllabus, 
but it is a legal claim of growing importance.37  A creature of both statute and 
common law, the tort’s scope varies somewhat from state to state.38  It gen-
erally encompasses the right to prevent the unauthorized use of peoples’ 
names and likenesses, though some jurisdictions even recognize a right to 
prohibit others from merely “evoking” a person in the minds of viewers or 
listeners.39 
Courts and scholars have suggested a slew of justifications for publicity 
rights.40  Some focus on benefits to the public, such as the idea that publicity 
                                                          
 37.  See supra notes 5–8, 10–15. 
 38.  MCCARTHY, supra note 24, at § 6:2. 
 39.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM LAW INST. 1995) (“One who 
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s 
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability . . . .”); Lemley, 
supra note 10, at 1169 (“[T]he situation is so bad that the actual elements of the right of publicity 
cause of action in California are (1) use of something that reminds someone of a person (2) for 
economic advantage.”). 
 40.  See generally C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Me-
dia, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089–90 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); 
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 98–112 (analyzing the various purported interests). 
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rights efficiently maximize wealth and allocate resources,41 or that they cre-
ate incentives for people to act in ways that ultimately advance public wel-
fare.42  Other justifications claim to serve individual interests by, for exam-
ple, rewarding labor and preventing unjust enrichment caused by 
freeloading43 or addressing dignitary injuries that unauthorized portrayals in-
flict on a person’s autonomy, liberty, and privacy.44  And some justifications 
seek to vindicate both public and individual concerns, like the notion that 
publicity rights provide a remedy for false product endorsements that deceive 
consumers and inflict dignitary injuries on the person falsely associated with 
the product.45  Many of these purported justifications have been undermined 
or debunked—a matter we will return to later.  For now, it suffices to say 
that, although there may be sound reasons to doubt the wisdom of recogniz-
ing a right of publicity at all,46 that ship has likely sailed.  At least thirty-three 
states now recognize some form of the tort, and that number seems more 
likely to grow than shrink.47 
A. The Right of Publicity’s Commercial Core 
To understand the tension between publicity rights and free speech, it is 
important to recognize the tort’s commercial core.48  A typical use of the right 
of publicity is to challenge the unauthorized use of a person’s name or image 
in association with a commercial advertisement or product.  If, for example, 
a supermarket promotes itself in a magazine by sticking its logo next to Mi-
chael Jordan’s name and a pair of basketball shoes bearing his famed number 
“23,” Jordan might have a viable claim that the supermarket violated his right 
of publicity.49  The combination of the commercial advertisement and the 
unauthorized use of his name and legendary apparel would likely satisfy the 
                                                          
 41.  Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38, 438 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994); WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
210–53 (2003); Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 97, 103–04, 126 (1994); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 412–
13 (1978). 
 42.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
 43.  ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 105–10 (summarizing and critiquing this justification). 
 44.  See, e.g., id. at 111–12; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational 
Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 158–59 (2001); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autono-
mous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005). 
 45.  See generally Lemley, supra note 10, at 1163–64; McKenna, supra note 44. 
 46.  Madow, supra note 29, at 178–238; see also Rothman, supra note 29, at 245 n.218. 
 47.  MCCARTHY, supra note 24, at § 6:2; The Law, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY, https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law (last visited May 2, 2019). 
 48.  By using this term, I mean not to imply that publicity rights originally or exclusively pro-
tected commercial interests.  As Rothman has shown, the right of publicity has long been concerned 
with privacy harms that need not be economic.  See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 1–64. 
 49.  This hypothetical isn’t all that hypothetical.  Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 
509, 512 (7th Cir. 2014) (reviving Jordan’s challenge to a supermarket’s “A Shoe In!” ad). 
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tort’s elements in most jurisdictions.50  It is important to note, however, that 
publicity rights need not depend on misleading implications of endorsement.  
Suppose that a supermarket frequented by fans of a rival team published an 
advertisement saying: “MJ may be a six-time NBA champion and the star of 
Space Jam, but he’s never graced our grocery store!”  Jordan’s claim would 
not sound in a theory of endorsement, but he could still challenge the com-
mercial appropriation of his name and likeness.51 
At the very least, then, publicity rights have been understood as a form 
of “property protection” that allows people to “profit from the full commer-
cial value of their identities” and challenge the “false and misleading impres-
sion” of association with a commercial product or service.52  This commer-
cial core has important constitutional implications because it means that 
many publicity claims challenge uses in “commercial” speech,53 which has a 
“special meaning” in the First Amendment context.54  Although the line be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech can be elusive, the clearest 
example is speech that is “related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience”55 and “does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.’”56  Even if an advertisement contains speech about important 
public issues, it may nonetheless constitute commercial speech if it promotes 
a product and is economically motivated.57 
                                                          
 50.  These elements vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts provides a representative model: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name 
or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  Jordan’s lawyers would surely have endorsed 
the accompanying comment, which states that the “common form” of this tort “is the appropriation 
and use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to advertise the defendant’s business or product, or for 
some similar commercial purpose.”  Id. § 652C cmt.  
 51.  See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967–68 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (formulating a similar hypothetical based on Madonna’s distaste for bananas).  In my 
view, there might be constitutional and policy grounds to question a broad publicity-based protec-
tion for mere associations. 
 52.  See id. at 968; Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001). 
 53.  See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving a 
claim by a Major League Baseball player against a publishing company for using his likeness to its 
commercial advantage). 
 54.  Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 55.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 56.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Va. State Pharmacy 
Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).  Following Bolger, lower 
courts have distilled three factors relevant to deciding if speech is commercial.  See, e.g., Dryer v. 
Nat’l Football League, 814 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2016) (considering “(i) whether the communi-
cation is an advertisement, (ii) whether it refers to a specific product or service, and (iii) whether 
the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech” (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 
173 F.3d 1109, 1120 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 970 (“[C]ommercial 
speech is best understood as speech that merely advertises a product or service for business pur-
poses.”). 
 57.  See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–68. 
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The right of publicity’s commercial core is important for two reasons.  
First, as the doctrine currently stands, false or deceptive commercial speech 
enjoys no First Amendment protection.58  This rule liberates many publicity 
claims from constitutional scrutiny entirely, for the First Amendment offers 
no shield against liability for misleading commercial associations, like the 
ones in our Michael Jordan examples.59  Second, even if speech is not false 
or misleading, by merely being commercial it is entitled to lesser First 
Amendment protection than noncommercial speech.60  Because of this lim-
ited constitutional protection, states have greater leeway to regulate commer-
cial speech.61  The result is that many publicity claims will win out over any 
asserted right to portray real people in commercial speech.62 
B. Expressive Works and the Right of Publicity 
If the core of the right of publicity is commercial, what does the right of 
publicity have to do with expressive works?  One answer might be “nothing 
at all.”  The author of the leading treatise on the right of publicity, Professor 
J. Thomas McCarthy, has made such a claim: “[T]he only kind of speech 
impacted by the right of publicity is commercial speech—advertising.  Not 
news, not stories, not entertainment and not entertainment satire and par-
ody—only advertising and similar commercial uses.”63  Even Professor Mi-
chael Madow, who fretted over the burgeoning right of publicity, confidently 
declared that “personas may be freely appropriated for . . . ‘entertainment’ 
purposes . . . [and] permission need not be obtained, nor payment made, for 
use of a celebrity’s name or likeness in a news report, novel, play, film, or 
                                                          
 58.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563–64. 
 59.  See id.; Rothman, supra note 23, at 1955–56. 
 60.  Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999). 
 61.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562. 
 62.  See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001).  But 
see supra note 51.  The right of publicity’s commercial core might be important for a third reason.  
Although this is somewhat conjectural, it might explain why so much publicity doctrine has adopted 
the listener-focused theory of free speech discussed in this Article.  As a constitutional category, 
commercial speech is subjected to greater regulation in part because courts have adopted a listener-
focused theory in shaping the doctrine.  The constitutional analysis is built around consumers’ in-
terests in receiving accurate information about commercial products.  The commercial speaker, 
then, gains constitutional protection primarily as a means to ensure that the listener receives non-
misleading information.  See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1979) (upholding a state law 
prohibiting optometrists’ use of trade names because “[a] trade name conveys no information about 
the price and nature of the services”); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, 
and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 775–76 (1999) (“Con-
ventional First Amendment doctrine holds that the Constitution protects commercial speech only to 
enable listeners to receive valuable ‘information’ about the market.”). 
 63.  J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture—The Human Persona 
As Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 131 (1995); 
see also J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The Right 
of Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 198 (2001). 
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biography.”64  But as Professor Jennifer Rothman has persuasively shown, 
“[t]he facts on the ground . . . challenge this vision of a limited right.”65 
Rothman’s “facts on the ground” are shown in case after case, where 
courts have not dispatched with publicity claims through a commercial-
speech-only rule but instead grappled with whether publicity rights may pre-
vent or punish portrayals of real people in expressive works.66  Lawsuits have 
been brought against filmmakers, by the former manager of rap group 
N.W.A.;67 against actors, by the banker who inspired the toupee-wearing 
crook in The Wolf of Wall Street;68 against TV-show producers, by a New 
Yorker convicted of murdering his parents;69 against podcasters, by the estate 
of the protagonist from the hit series S-Town;70 against videogame creators, 
by the heirs of long-deceased war hero, Lieutenant General George Patton;71 
and even against documentarians, by the record holder in the Donkey Kong 
arcade game.72 
For free-speech enthusiasts, it might be surprising that the viability of 
these claims is even debatable.  The First Amendment generally provides ro-
bust protection for expressive works as a speech medium,73 even when the 
                                                          
 64.  Madow, supra note 29, at 130. 
 65.  Rothman, supra note 23, at 1951–59.  It is important to note that, although most states 
require the unauthorized use to be for “a commercial purpose,” sometimes “any purpose or ad-
vantage” will suffice.  See id. at 1950. 
 66.  E.g., Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2016); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 
2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2013); C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. 
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007); Cardtoons, 
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970–76 (10th Cir. 1996).  Although 
these claims seem to be cropping up with increasing regularity, they are by no means new.  See, 
e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93–94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that a plaintiff truthfully 
identified as a prostitute in a movie was entitled to block the showing of the movie). 
 67.  See Heller v. NBCUniversal, Inc., No. CV-15-09631-MWF-KS, 2016 WL 6573985, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2016) (suit arising from the biographical film Straight Outta Compton). 
 68.  Greene v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 138 F. Supp. 3d 226, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (suit aris-
ing from the movie The Wolf of Wall Street). 
 69.  Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC, 47 N.Y. S.3d 769, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (suit 
arising from the made-for-TV biopic Romeo Killer: The Christopher Porco Story).  In another re-
cent case, the makers of a TV miniseries have faced publicity claims brought by the Fox News 
staffer whose sexual-harassment allegations against former Fox News chief Roger Ailes led to his 
ouster.  See Complaint, Luhn v. Scott, No. 1:19-cv-01180 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2019). 
 70.  Matt Stevens, ‘S-Town’s’ Treatment of Its Main Character Was Riveting. But Was It Un-
lawful?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/arts/s-town-podcast-
lawsuit-john-b-mclemore.html (reporting on suit arising from the podcast S-Town). 
 71.  Complaint, CMG Worldwide Inc. v. Slitherine Ltd., No. 3:14-cv-05124 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
19, 2014) (suit arising from the videogame History Legends of War: Patton).  
 72.  Mitchell v. Cartoon Network, Inc., Civ. No. 15-5668, 2015 WL 12839135, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 20, 2015) (suit arising from the documentary The King of Kong: A Fistful of Quarters). 
 73.  Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973) (“[P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, 
and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection . . . .”). 
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works are sold commercially.74  Expressive works do not suddenly become 
commercial speech because they are sold for profit.75  As one court has 
quipped, creators “need not give away [their works] in order to bring them 
within the ambit of the First Amendment.”76  What’s more, the First Amend-
ment disfavors content-based speech restrictions, and publicity claims that 
challenge portrayals of real people in expressive works “target speech based 
on its communicative content.”77  It is no response to say that publicity claims 
involve disputes between private parties; civil liability for speech acts must 
still comport with the Constitution, even if the issue arises in a private tort 
suit.78  As the Supreme Court made clear long ago in New York Times v. 
Sullivan,79 torts like the right of publicity are “mere labels” of state law that 
“can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and in-
stead “must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”80 
All of this might suggest that the resolution in these cases is actually 
quite simple.  The dispositive inquiry is whether the speech is commercial or 
noncommercial; and if it is noncommercial, it is protected.  But, of course, 
such a straightforward resolution has not emerged from the courts.  Instead, 
as Part II illustrates, courts have struggled to agree on how to square publicity 
rights with free-speech rights when real people are portrayed in expressive 
works. 
II. WHAT’S THE MATTER (OF PUBLIC CONCERN)? 
How have courts been trying to resolve the tension between publicity 
rights and free speech?  Because the tort’s elements plausibly regulate so 
much protected speech, most of the work in confining the scope of publicity 
rights has been done by defenses.81  Creators of expressive works have raised 
a slew of defenses against claims brought by people whose likenesses they 
employ, and courts have developed various tests to address these conflicts 
                                                          
 74.  Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (“If a profit mo-
tive could somehow strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our 
cases from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels.”); Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952). 
 75.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 
(1976); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988). 
 76.  Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d at 970. 
 77.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); see also Volokh, supra note 
32, at 912 & n.35. 
 78.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.5.1 (3d ed. 2006). 
 79.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 80.  Id. at 269 (applying this analysis in the context of state defamation law).  
 81.  See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1170. 
 912 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:899 
between publicity rights and free speech.82  Four distinct defenses have re-
sponded to an important yet understudied objection to publicity rights: re-
stricting portrayals of real people in expressive works inhibits speech on mat-
ters of public concern. 
This Part begins by recounting how First Amendment doctrine and the-
ory have traditionally framed protections for speech on matters of public con-
cern.  This tale takes us away from the right of publicity, as much of the 
history focuses on free-speech challenges to other torts.  We will then return 
to publicity rights to explore the four defenses that have emerged in that 
realm.83  
A. Educative Free-Speech Theory 
Speech on matters of public concern is said to lie “at the core of the First 
Amendment.”84  Sometimes referred to as speech that is “newsworthy”85 or 
about “public issues,”86 the labels are now interchangeable.87  No matter what 
you call it, courts are loath to uphold laws that restrict this kind of speech.88 
One reason courts hold speech on matters of public concern so dear is 
that First Amendment theory and doctrine have lauded access to information 
as essential to the public’s ability to engage in self-government.  This lis-
tener-focused justification “views the public, in its role as the electorate, as 
ultimately responsible for political decisions,” and thus the First Amendment 
creates a presumption that the public is “entitled to all information that is 
                                                          
 82.  See generally Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
891, 910–19 (2017) (observing that “the First Amendment is invoked to micromanage the applica-
tion of right of publicity law” and that “[t]he doctrine gets much of its essential shape from courts’ 
habitual use of free-speech-type defenses, even as the application of these defenses is often inco-
herent” (emphasis omitted)). 
 83.  See infra Section II.B. 
 84.  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of 
W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997) (“Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are 
classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment.”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (“[E]xpression on public issues ‘has always rested on the high-
est rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 
(1980)). 
 85.  Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 400 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). 
 86.  Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 87.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 2011) (“‘News’ means information of public con-
cern relating to local, statewide, national, or worldwide issues or events.”); Richard T. Karcher, Tort 
Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 824 (2009) (“Whether something is of a 
legitimate public concern turns on a determination of newsworthiness . . . .”); Mary-Rose Papan-
drea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 580 (2007) (observing 
that the newsworthiness standard “involves essentially the same inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test”). 
 88.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (holding that speech in a “public 
place on a matter of public concern . . . is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amend-
ment”); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479 (subjecting an antipicketing ordinance to “careful scrutiny”). 
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necessary for informed governance.”89  For many years, the dominant theory 
used to explain and justify the First Amendment’s reach relied on this con-
nection between access to information and political self-governance.  Let’s 
call this theory “educative,” because it focuses on the role that information 
plays in educating voters so that they can engage in democratic delibera-
tion—it justifies speech protection not because of any individual right of ex-
pression but instead because of the need to create an informed public.90 
As a threshold matter, a helpful way to think of educative theory in con-
trast to other First Amendment theories is in terms of concern over protecting 
the listener versus protecting the speaker.  Educative theory is a listener-fo-
cused theory because it concerns the public’s right to receive information and 
to be informed.  In contrast, speaker-based theories focus not on the public’s 
ability to use speech as a means to the end of becoming informed, but instead 
because it promotes some other value for the speaker.91 
The father of modern educative theory is Alexander Meiklejohn.  He 
emphasized the role of free speech in enabling people to have access to in-
formation in order to make informed political decisions, famously using the 
idea of the “town meeting” to explain the First Amendment’s boundaries.92  
At these meetings, he said, citizens “discuss and . . . decide matters of public 
policy,” for “[w]hen men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—
who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger” of par-
ticular policies.93  For Meiklejohn, then, “[t]he principle of the freedom of 
speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.”94  
Meiklejohn’s theory frames the First Amendment as a means to an end: free 
speech is necessary so that citizens can be good listeners and remain informed 
about public issues, can hold government accountable, and, ultimately, en-
gage in self-governance.95  If citizens are not free to learn about and then 
                                                          
 89.  Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 999 (1989). 
 90.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 55 (arguing that the First Amendment “has no concern 
about the ‘needs of many men to express their opinions’” but rather is concerned with “the common 
needs of all the members of the body politic”); id. at 56–57, 61 (criticizing Zechariah Chafee, Jr.’s 
“inclusion of an individual interest within the scope of the First Amendment,” and Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s “excessive individualism” on this front); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: 
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109–23 
(1993). 
 91.  See infra notes 129–137 and accompanying discussion. 
 92.  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24, 
26 (1948).  
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 75 (arguing that the First Amendment’s “purpose is to give 
to every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of 
those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal”); MEIKLEJOHN, supra 
note 92, at 88–89 (“The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, 
so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.”). 
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discuss matters of public concern, they cannot set political agendas, advance 
ideas, and criticize elected officials.  But although Meiklejohn’s account 
might at first seem to take the speaker into account, his famous phrase shows 
us otherwise.  The point of free speech, he stressed, is not that everyone shall 
speak but that “everything worth saying shall be said.”96 
Meiklejohn’s work greatly influenced later theorists.  His disciples in-
clude Professor Owen Fiss, who argued that “[t]he purpose of free speech is 
not individual self-actualization, but rather the preservation of democracy, 
and the right of a people, as a people, to decide what kind of life it wishes to 
live.”97  Thus, according to Fiss, “[w]e allow people to speak so others can 
vote” because “[s]peech allows people to vote intelligently and freely, aware 
of all the options and in possession of all the relevant information.”98  Like 
Meiklejohn, then, Fiss viewed any individual speech right in instrumental 
terms, worthy of protection “only when it enriches public debate”99 and 
serves “as a means or instrument of collective self-determination.”100  Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein has echoed these sentiments, maintaining that the pri-
mary purpose of free speech is to promote deliberative democracy—“a sys-
tem in which citizens are informed about public issues and able to make 
judgments on the basis of reasons.”101 
The principles of educative theory, from Meiklejohn to the modern day, 
pervade First Amendment jurisprudence.  This is particularly true where tort 
liability would pose a threat to free speech, when educative theory has prin-
cipally appeared in two realms: the public-figure doctrine102 and the news-
worthiness doctrine.103  Both doctrines reflect listener-based concerns be-
cause they “ultimately lead to the same issue, which is the nature of the public 
                                                          
 96.  MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 26; see also id. at 55; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 92, at 25 
(“The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness.  It does not require 
that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public debate.  Nor can it even give assurance 
that everyone shall have opportunity to do so.”); Meiklejohn, supra note 36, at 255 (“The First 
Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom to speak.’  It is concerned, not with a private right, but with 
a public power, a governmental responsibility.”). 
 97.  Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409–10 (1986). 
 98.  OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF 
STATE POWER 13 (1996). 
 99.  Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987). 
 100.  Fiss, supra note 97, at 1409–10. 
 101.  Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2000); see 
also J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1935 (1995). 
 102.  A “public figure” is any person who has “assumed roles of especial prominence in the 
affairs of society,” either because they “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence” 
or because they “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to 
influence the resolution of the issues involved.”  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 
(1974). 
 103.  I use this nomenclature for simplicity’s sake, though at times the courts use alternative 
language.  See supra note 87. 
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and its right to demand information.”104  Thus, the public-figure and news-
worthiness doctrines can be glossed as educative doctrines—and courts will 
often do so. 
Under the public-figure doctrine, speech on public issues receives 
heightened protection through a requirement that public-figure plaintiffs sat-
isfy heightened evidentiary burdens in certain tort actions.105  The doctrine 
developed principally in defamation law, beginning with the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.106  Under Sul-
livan and its progeny, public figures in defamation actions must prove that 
the defendant made the allegedly defamatory statement with actual malice—
that is, “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”107  The Court subsequently extended this rule to 
tort claims brought by public figures for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, meaning that public-figure plaintiffs who bring these claims must 
satisfy the rigors of actual malice if they are to prevail.108 
The rationale behind this heightened burden in the public-figure doc-
trine derives from listener-based educative concerns.  Because public figures 
play an important role in society, it is crucial that citizens be fully informed 
about them.109  So strong is this interest that the First Amendment protects 
even some false speech about public figures—which is “inevitable in free 
debate”110—because only such a prophylactic rule could foster the “breathing 
space” required for the circulation of speech about public issues.111  Thus, at 
its core, the public-figure doctrine adopts an educative theory of the First 
Amendment.  Indeed, Meiklejohn himself proclaimed that the Sullivan deci-
sion was “an occasion for dancing in the streets.”112 
                                                          
 104.  Post, supra note 89, at 997. 
 105.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277, 279–80 (1964). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 279–80 (establishing the rule for public officials); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 
U.S. 265, 274 (1971) (extending the rule to candidates for political office); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (extending the rule to nonpolitical public figures); see also id. 
at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (positing that any differentiation between public figures and offi-
cials “would have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy”). 
 108.  Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
 109.  See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1964) (“[W]here the criticism is of public 
officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the 
larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”). 
 110.  N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271–72.  
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the 
First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125. 
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The newsworthiness doctrine, too, acts as a shield for speech on matters 
of public concern.113  Even before the Sullivan Court constitutionalized def-
amation law because of the importance of “debate on public issues,”114 the 
common-law defamation defense of fair comment and criticism sought to 
protect discussion of matters in the public interest.115  Nowadays, the news-
worthiness doctrine has constitutional or quasi-constitutional116 import in a 
wide swath of legal disputes, including cases involving defamation,117 public 
disclosure of private facts,118 false light,119 intentional infliction of emotional 
distress,120 copyright,121 government-employee speech,122 and freedom of the 
press.123  The doctrine has also been co-opted by a growing number of state 
statutes—often dubbed “anti-SLAPP” laws—that offer defendants certain 
procedural protections against frivolous lawsuits aimed at chilling speech on 
public issues.124 
Like the public-figure doctrine, the newsworthiness doctrine is ani-
mated by an educative theory of the First Amendment.  As the Supreme Court 
explained, people must be free to discuss “all issues about which information 
is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the 
                                                          
 113.  See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–
02 (1940). 
 114.  N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. 
 115.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 831 (5th ed. 
1984).  As with the public-figure doctrine, defamation law played a salient role in the development 
of the newsworthiness doctrine.  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogated 
by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), a plurality of the Court attempted to extend 
the Sullivan’s standard to all matters of public concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a 
public or private figure.  Id. at 43.  In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), however, 
the majority expressly rejected the extension of the actual-malice standard to private persons caught 
up in matters of public concern.  Id. at 346.  But even the Gertz Court could not bring itself to 
jettison newsworthiness entirely.  When the Court explored the contours of who would qualify as a 
public figure, it remarked that most commonly they would be those people who have “thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the 
issues involved.”  Id. at 345 (emphases added).  Even on its deathbed, the newsworthiness doctrine 
clung on, perhaps to return again when a particular justice found the results of the public-figure 
approach intolerable. 
 116.  By “quasi-constitutional,” I refer principally to various newsworthiness defenses or excep-
tions under state law that aim to avoid First Amendment concerns under federal law.  See also infra 
Sections III.B.3, III.B.4.  But it could also describe instances where federal law is construed to leave 
breathing room that might otherwise be required by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle 
Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
“[t]he scope of the fair use doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of public concern”). 
 117.  See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). 
 118.  See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA 123–24 (2008). 
 119.  Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). 
 120.  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011).  
 121.  Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 15 F.3d at 562. 
 122.  Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 123.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519, 535 (2001). 
 124.  See, e.g., 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-1 (2012). 
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exigencies of their period.”125  The electorate, as the arbiter of political deci-
sions in a democratic system, relies on information to make educated deci-
sions.126  The public, therefore, “is presumptively entitled to all information 
that is necessary for informed governance.”127 
There is no escaping the fact that a listener-based educative theory un-
derlies much First Amendment doctrine, and that is not going anywhere an-
ytime soon.  But for all its widespread adoption and acceptance, the theory 
fails to capture something important about the right to free speech.  The prob-
lem with educative theory is not that it is incorrect—it is that the theory is 
incomplete.  By single-mindedly protecting speech for the sake of the lis-
tener, educative theory misses half of the equation: protecting discussion for 
the sake of the speaker.  Educative theory subordinates individual expressive 
rights to concerns about creating an informed public and, in so doing, under-
values the crucial role that the First Amendment should play in protecting 
speakers’ rights to participate in public discourse.  To revise Meiklejohn’s 
mantra, the objective of free speech should be that everyone may speak, not 
merely that everything worth saying gets said.128 
This brings us to the speaker-based theories used to justify First Amend-
ment protection.  Professors Robert Post and Jack Balkin have developed 
non-educative theories to explain why the First Amendment should protect 
our ability to participate in “public discourse”—that is, to participate as a 
speaker in the communicative processes that form public opinion.129  Alt-
hough it is important to remain informed about public issues, the boundaries 
                                                          
 125.  Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, No-
body’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810 
(2010). 
 126.  POST, supra note 4, at 77–78. 
 127.  Id. at 78. 
 128.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 26. 
 129.  For background on the concept of “public discourse” as an animating concern of the First 
Amendment, see ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 49 (2014) [hereinafter POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED] (“I shall use the term public dis-
course to describe the communicative processes by which persons participate in the formation of 
public opinion.”); ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 15 (2012) [hereinafter POST, 
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM]; POST, supra note 4, at 7 (defining public 
discourse as “an open structure of communication” in which there can be “reconciliation of individ-
ual and collective autonomy”); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1210–20 (2016); Robert Post,  Participatory Democracy as a Theory 
of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 621 (2011); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status 
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (“Public discourse is comprised of those 
processes of communication that must remain open to the participation of citizens if democratic 
legitimacy is to be maintained.”) [hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial 
Speech]; Post, supra note 90, at 1115–16 (using the term “public discourse” to refer to the “com-
municative processes sufficient to instill in citizens a sense of participation, legitimacy, and identi-
fication”); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 637–38 (1990) 
(defining public discourse as “critical interaction” between members of a community and noting 
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of public discourse depend not on the content of speech but rather on the 
social function of particular communications.130  We are “social creatures” 
who become who we are “through conversation, through absorbing popular 
art and culture, and through being influenced by the ideas and opinions of the 
people around [us].”131  We thus contribute to the formation of public opinion 
by expressing our ideas, beliefs, and opinions to one another. This expression 
enables us to engage in processes of mutual influence that shape the political 
and cultural power in our communities.132  The objective of free speech, then, 
is to protect the speaker’s right to participate in public discourse, not simply 
the listener’s right to receive information. 
Post and Balkin offer slightly different reasons to explain why the First 
Amendment should protect a right to participate in public discourse.  Post 
ties his theory to the need for democratic legitimacy, which “depends upon 
citizens having the warranted belief that their government is responsive to 
their wishes.”133  In order to sustain this belief, citizens in a democracy must 
be free to engage in communicative processes that instill a sense of “partici-
pation, legitimacy, and identification.”134  Balkin’s approach does not deny 
that participation in public discourse serves this legitimating function in a 
democracy.  But whereas Post ultimately grounds his theory in political self-
governance, Balkin’s justification focuses on cultural power, of which polit-
ical power is but one element.135  In Balkin’s view, “[p]eople have a right to 
participate in forms of power that reshape and alter them because what is 
literally at stake is their own selves.”136  Participation in public discourse em-
powers people to shape the formation of culture, and for that reason it should 
receive the highest constitutional protection.  The differences between Post’s 
and Balkin’s theories matter not for purposes of this Article.  What matters 
is their common conviction—one that I share—that people must be free to 
                                                          
that “[c]ontemporary constitutional doctrine looks to this debate to constitute that ‘universe of dis-
course’ within which public opinion, and hence democratic policy, may be formed”); Robert Post, 
An Analysis of DOJ’s Brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-analysis-of-doj-s-brief-in-masterpiece-cakeshop. 
 130.  Balkin, supra note 129, at 1214. 
 131.  Id. at 1211. 
 132.  See id. at 1211–12; Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 
NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2015) [hereinafter Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amend-
ment]; Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech 
and Democratic Culture]; Madow, supra note 29, at 127, 239. 
 133.  Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 129, at 7. 
 134.  Post, supra note 90, at 1115; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (emphasizing the role of free speech in “provid[ing] for participation in de-
cision making by all members of society”); Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 
supra note 129, at 7. 
 135.  Balkin, supra note 129, at 1211. 
 136.  Id. 
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participate in the formation of public opinion by creating expressive 
works.137 
When the purpose of free speech is recast in these terms, the limited 
protection offered by educative theory is easier to see.  If you justify protect-
ing speech based solely on its ability to inform a listener about matters of 
public concern, the theory and the jurisprudence it creates offer less protec-
tion to speech that fails to serve an educative function.  Hinging speech rights 
on conveying information to listeners is a limiting, and damning, approach 
for some expressive works: should a work fail to inform a listener, in what-
ever context that might be, it will not receive robust First Amendment pro-
tection.  At best, educative theory provides creators of expressive works with 
parasitic protection: as speakers, their rights feed off the listener’s right to 
receive information, and their rights perish if they fail to convey information 
that listeners need to know. 
Educative theorists like Meiklejohn have admitted this limitation. When 
pushed on why art, for example, might deserve First Amendment protection, 
Meiklejohn relied on its ability to assist the voter in making decisions.138  
Self-government, he insisted, “can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the 
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general wel-
fare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”139  In his view, 
art may help voters develop “knowledge, intelligence, [and] sensitivity to hu-
man values”—all of which guide our decisions when we vote.140  This means-
to-an-end account of the constitutional value of expressive works pegs First 
Amendment protection to the works’ ability to assist the public in exercising 
political judgment.  As Balkin has remarked, in Meiklejohn’s world, “culture 
is instrumentally valuable to the extent that it assists political self-govern-
ance, by allowing people to understand the issues of the day.”141  In other 
words, the speaker is the listener’s servant. 
The listener-based educative theory also creates an additional risk for 
free speech: it opens the door to elitism by tying the decision to protect an 
expressive work to its ability to “inform” the public.142  To understand why, 
                                                          
 137.  See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 485–86 
(2011); Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 132, at 5. 
 138.  Meiklejohn, supra note 36, at 255–57. 
 139.  Id. at 255. 
 140.  Id. at 256. 
 141.  Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 132, at 1056. 
 142.  Balkin has critiqued the educative theories proffered by the likes of Meiklejohn, Fiss, and 
Sunstein in similar terms: 
The First Amendment does not protect mass culture for the sake of avant-gardism and 
high art; rather it protects the latter because they are part of a larger phenomenon—the 
carnival of public discourse and popular culture that arises in a democratized society.  
The First Amendment is about Spielberg as much as Bergman, about the Jackson Five as 
much as Jackson Pollock, about Rambo as much as Rimbaud.  Meiklejohn and his intel-
lectual progeny have always shared this dual failing: Defending art in the name of politics 
 920 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:899 
it helps to imagine the various educative theorists as falling along a spectrum 
based on their answers to a seemingly simple question: What information 
does the public need to know?  The determination of the informative value 
of speech runs along a spectrum between what I call cramped educative the-
ory and capacious educative theory.  At one end, the cramped theorists, the 
most notable being Robert Bork, argue that “[c]onstitutional protection 
should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political.”143  Cramped 
theorists accept that the public must remain informed about important issues 
but adopt a narrow view of what the public needs to know.  Meanwhile, at 
the other end of the spectrum lie capacious theorists like Meiklejohn who 
cram a lot into their informing-the-public box.144  Like cramped theorists, 
capacious theorists laud the need for an informed public, but, unlike cramped 
theorists, they see informative value in all sorts of popular culture that Bork 
would constitutionally disparage.145 
This educative spectrum invites elitism that undervalues popular cul-
ture.  This commonly takes the form of “politico-centrism,” which is the ten-
dency to “overstress the importance of politics to the life of ordinary citi-
zens.”146  Politico-centrists often belittle and devalue speech that is not 
clearly linked to electoral politics, and this free-speech myopia creates haz-
ardous conditions for a host of expressive works that primarily seek to enter-
tain rather than inform.147  That is not to say, of course, that expressive works 
cannot do both. Many do.  It is just that it is easier for politico-centrists to 
hide their elitism when an expressive work serves no obvious informative 
function, as is true for many expressive works. 
                                                          
and all art in the name of high art, they inevitably neglect the cultural and condescend 
towards the popular. 
Balkin, supra note 101, at 1963. 
 143.  Bork, supra note 36, at 20 (emphasis added); see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 598–99 (1982) (calling Bork’s approach “the most narrowly con-
fined protection of speech ever supported by a modem jurist or academic”). 
 144.  See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. 
 145.  Compare Bork, supra note 36, at 20 (“Constitutional protection should be accorded only 
to speech that is explicitly political.  There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other 
form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or porno-
graphic.”), with Meiklejohn, supra note 36, at 257 (justifying protection for “[l]iterature and the 
arts” because “[t]hey lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the 
values out of which the riches of the general welfare are created”). 
 146.  Balkin, supra note 101, at 1985–86. 
 147.  See id. at 1957–58, 1961 (“For Meiklejohn, art is protected because it serves politics; for 
Sunstein art is protected because it is continually threatened by politicians.  In both cases, the con-
stitutional value of art is a reflection of its relation to politics—either as its aid or its enemy, either 
as its servant or its victim, either as an instrument of its realization or as its familiar and recurrent 
prey.”). 
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Even capacious educative theorists like Meiklejohn could be accused of 
politico-centric elitism,148 but others have been more flagrant in their disdain 
for popular culture and their fondness for politics.  Sunstein, for example, has 
suggested that nonpolitical art should receive diminished First Amendment 
protection,149 while Bork would not protect nonpolitical art at all.150  Fiss, 
meanwhile, argued that government programs like the National Endowment 
for the Arts should promote discussion of public issues by supporting artists 
whose works deal with matters of public concern.151  This proposal sounds 
fine in principle, but it takes on a different tone when paired with Fiss’s skep-
ticism about the constitutional value of some popular culture, such as when 
he disdainfully contrasts MTV and I Love Lucy with “the information [citi-
zens] need to make free and intelligent choices about government policy, the 
structure of government, or the nature of society.”152  My point is not that we 
must ignore that some speech better equips voters to make informed deci-
sions; it is that educative doctrine—which asks courts to pick the information 
that voters need to know—is susceptible to elitism that prejudices expressive 
works having little to do with electoral politics. 
This educative spectrum carries over into the courts, where judges 
broadly or narrowly construe what constitutes a matter of public concern.153  
As we will see in greater detail shortly, consider the various state-law excep-
tions to the right of publicity for speech that is “newsworthy” or in the “public 
interest.”154  The Indiana Supreme Court recently construed Indiana’s news-
worthy exception “broadly” to cover the use of college athletes’ names, im-
ages, and statistics in conducting fantasy-sports games.155  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, adopted a narrow under-
                                                          
 148.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at xv–xvi (lamenting that privately owned television 
broadcasters were “dangerous” to the public’s “morality and intelligence” because they were “de-
stroying and degrading our intelligence and our taste by the use of instruments which should be 
employed in educating and uplifting them”); Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 
supra note 132, at 1056 (ascribing the “politico-centric” label to Meiklejohn’s theory of the First 
Amendment). 
 149.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 153–59; see also id. at 84–91 (belittling “low quality” televi-
sion programming that appeals to tastes of uneducated). 
 150.  Bork, supra note 36, at 26–28. 
 151.  FISS, supra note 36, at 40–45. 
 152.  Fiss, supra note 99, at 788; see also Fiss, supra note 97, at 1413 (“From the perspective of 
a free and open debate, the choice between Love Boat and Fantasy Island is trivial.”). 
 153.  This judicial inconsistency is likely exacerbated by the fact that the term is ambiguously 
defined both normatively (what the public ought to know) and descriptively (what the public wants 
to know).  See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (defining a “matter of public concern” 
as speech that is “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community” or “a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of 
value and concern to the public” (first quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); then 
quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004))); Post, supra note 35, at 1057. 
 154.  See infra Section II.B.3. 
 155.  Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 396 (Ind. 2018). 
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standing of California’s analogous exception, holding that a videogame fea-
turing college athletes did not concern “matters in the public interest” be-
cause it was merely “a game, not a reference source,” and involved no “pub-
lication or reporting” of “factual information” or “factual data.”156  Bork 
would have smiled at the Ninth Circuit’s judicial line-drawing, while Mei-
klejohn may well have frowned. 
B. Educative Defenses to Publicity Rights 
Over the years, educative theory has crept into the realm of the right of 
publicity.157  Four listener-based educative defenses have emerged: (1) a con-
stitutional affirmative defense to shield expressive works relating to matters 
                                                          
 156.  Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 
724 F.3d 1268, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 157.  See, e.g., id. at 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2013) (considering newsworthiness and ultimately re-
jecting the defense); Stayart v. Google Inc., 710 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that, 
under Wisconsin law, the “newsworthiness” exception applies “where a matter of legitimate public 
interest is concerned” (quoting Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 
N.W.2d 105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989))); C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Base-
ball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (considering newsworthiness and 
finding persuasive that there was “substantial public interest”); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 
395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that courts faced with publicity claims have “recognize[d] 
two closely related yet analytically distinct privileges”: (1) “the privilege to publish or broadcast 
facts, events, and information relating to public figures,” and (2) “the privilege to publish or broad-
cast news or other matters of public interest”); Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1249 
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining that, under California law, “[n]o right of publicity cause of action ‘will 
lie for the publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know 
and the freedom of the press to tell it’” (quoting Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 
1001 (9th Cir. 2001))); Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1355 (D. Colo. 2014) 
(explaining that, under Colorado law, there is a “privilege that permits the use of a plaintiff’s name 
or likeness when that use is made in the context of, and reasonably relates to, a publication concern-
ing a matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern” (quoting Joe Dickerson & Assocs., 
L.L.C. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo. 2001))); Somerson v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., 
956 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366–67 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (explaining that, under Georgia law, the “news-
worthiness” exception applies “where an incident is a matter of public interest, or the subject matter 
of a public investigation” (quoting Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th 
Cir. 2009))); Peckham v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(explaining that, under Massachusetts law, the “newsworthiness” defense applies if “the publication 
touches upon a matter of ‘legitimate public concern’”); Arenas v. Shed Media U.S. Inc., 881 F. 
Supp. 2d 1181, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining that, under California law, the “public interest 
defense” extends to publications about “people who, by their accomplishments, mode of living, 
professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities” 
(quoting Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001)); Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 
1097 (D. Haw. 2007) (explaining that, under Hawaii law, “newsworthiness” reflects “a line . . . to 
be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, 
and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a rea-
sonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern” (quoting 
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975))); Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., 
No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) (considering public-figure 
status and ultimately concluding that the plaintiff’s escapades made him a “notorious public fig-
ure”); Leviston v. Jackson, 980 N.Y.S.2d 716, 720 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (explaining that, under New 
York law, a plaintiff cannot recover “if the use to which his or her image was put is in the context 
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of public concern;158 (2) a constitutional requirement that public-figure plain-
tiffs prove “actual malice” in order to prevail on their publicity claims;159 (3) 
state-law exceptions to the right of publicity for portrayals that are “news-
worthy” or in the “public interest”;160 and (4) a method of constitutional 
avoidance in which courts narrowly construe publicity tort elements to evade 
certain free-speech concerns.161 
The unfortunate takeaway is that, despite the ostensible protection pro-
vided by these four defenses, the outcome is unfavorable for many creators 
of expressive works who portray real people.  Plaintiffs often prevail unless 
their publicity claim would harm the public’s ability to remain informed 
about matters of public concern.162  Thus, as with the educative defenses to 
other torts, these four defenses provide limited, parasitic protection to speak-
ers.163  The result is that creators of expressive works can be prevented from 
portraying real people in public discourse. 
1. The Constitutional Affirmative Defense 
The first educative challenge arises when defendants raise the First 
Amendment as an affirmative defense to liability under the right of publicity.  
Under this defense, an expressive work portraying a real person might get 
constitutional protection if the person portrayed is a public figure or the por-
trayal relates to a newsworthy event. 
In Leopold v. Levin,164 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment barred a claim brought by convicted murderer Nathan 
Leopold against the creators of a book and movie about his crime.165  Because 
Leopold’s crime remained “an American cause celèbre” and a “matter of 
                                                          
of reporting a newsworthy incident”); see also Jesse Koehler, Fraley v. Facebook: The Right of 
Publicity in Online Social Networks, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 963, 967–68 (2013). 
 158.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 159.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 160.  See infra Section II.B.3. 
 161.  See infra Section II.B.4. 
 162.  See Dogan, supra note 28, at 29 (asserting that courts will generally protect expressive 
works against publicity claims when those works are “perceived as newsworthy and informa-
tional”).  In some of the decisions discussed below, the courts did not denominate the right as a 
“right of publicity.”  This is particularly true for several older cases, where the court conceived of 
the unauthorized use as implicating the right of privacy.  See generally Madow, supra note 29, at 
167–78 (discussing the historical interplay between the rights of privacy and publicity); Robert C. 
Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 647 (1991) (exploring the relationship between privacy and property interests in the misap-
propriation and publicity torts).  For purposes of discussing educative challenges to the right to 
prevent unauthorized use of one’s image, the label of “privacy” or “publicity” does not matter.  For 
the sake of clarity, I will refer to the tort as the “right of publicity” throughout. 
 163.  See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1170 (“Some states have created protections for news re-
porting and some creative works, but those are often quite limited.”). 
 164.  259 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1970). 
 165.  Id. at 254.  
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public interest,” and because of Leopold’s “consequent and continuing status 
as a public figure,” the court explained that his publicity rights had to give 
way to the creators’ First Amendment rights.166  These rights rested on edu-
cative justifications about the public’s “strong curiosity and social and news 
interest in the crime.”167 
Similarly, in Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.,168 a federal 
district court relied upon the First Amendment when considering an actress’s 
claim against a magazine that published photos of her without her consent.169  
The court noted that the right of publicity “can be severely circumscribed as 
a result of an individual’s newsworthiness”170 and explained that constitu-
tional concerns could override New York’s right of publicity, “especially in 
the context of persons denominated ‘public figures,’ so as ‘to avoid any con-
flict with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and 
matters of public interest’ guaranteed by the First Amendment.”171  These 
educative concerns meant that publicity rights would “rarely” prevail when a 
person’s name or picture is used “in the context of an event within the ‘orbit 
of public interest and scrutiny’”—a category that includes “most of the events 
involving a public figure.”172  Because the photos informed the public about 
“a newsworthy event,” the court held that the First Amendment barred the 
actress’s claim.173 
But defendants’ pleas for an affirmative constitutional shield have not 
always been successful.  In Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night 
Co.,174 for example, a federal district court denied First Amendment protec-
tion to a play featuring performers who imitated the style and appearance of 
the Marx Brothers.175  The play portrayed the famous comedic troupe “in a 
new situation and with original lines,”176 but the court held that the First 
Amendment defense did not apply because the play was neither “biograph-
ical” nor “an attempt to convey information about the Marx Brothers them-
selves or about the development of their characters.”177  In other words, the 
                                                          
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 255.  For an analogous, and more contemporary, example from a different court, see 
Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *2–*4, (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 27, 2014) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim “cannot survive defendants’ First Amendment de-
fense” in part because his escapades as the “Dictator of Panama” made him a “notorious public 
figure”). 
 168.  498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  
 169.  Id. at 404. 
 170.  Id. at 405. 
 171.  Id. at 404 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967)). 
 172.  Id. at 405 (quoting Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 173.  Id. at 405–06. 
 174.  523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 175.   Id. at 493.  
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 494; see also Groucho Marx Prods., Inc., 689 F.2d at 319. 
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play was unprotected because it failed to serve educative goals of informing 
the public about the real-life Marx Brothers.178 
2. The Constitutional Actual-Malice Requirement 
Educative theory has also affected publicity through judicial importa-
tion of the constitutional actual-malice standard from defamation law.179  
Some courts have held that public-figure plaintiffs who are portrayed in 
“news or material of public concern” may prevail only if the portrayal con-
stituted a “false statement of fact” that the defendant published with 
“knowledge of its falsity” or “reckless disregard of its truth.”180 
                                                          
 178.  The California Supreme Court, too, has raised the public-figure and newsworthiness doc-
trines and yet ruled against defendants raising a First Amendment defense. In Comedy III Produc-
tions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), the court expressed its concern that 
“[g]iving broad scope to the right of publicity has the potential of allowing a celebrity to accomplish 
through the vigorous exercise of that right the censorship of unflattering commentary that cannot be 
constitutionally accomplished through defamation actions.”  Id. at 803–04.  The court even stressed 
that, “[o]nce the celebrity thrusts himself or herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment 
dictates that the right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the ce-
lebrity image must be given broad scope.”  Id. at 807.  Ultimately, though, the court ruled that the 
portrayal—a charcoal drawing of “The Three Stooges” comedy trio—was not sufficiently “trans-
formative” to get First Amendment protection.  Id. at 811. 
 179.  See Russell Hickey, Refashioning Actual Malice: Protecting Free Speech in the Right of 
Publicity Era, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1101, 1117 (2006) (“If . . . the work is classified 
as pure speech, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving actual malice.  Otherwise, the possi-
bility remains that public figure plaintiffs will increasingly exploit the right of publicity as a means 
for curtailing legitimate speech that should otherwise be fully protected under the First Amend-
ment.”). 
 180.  William O’Neil & Co. v. Validea.com Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(“Because [the book about the public-figure plaintiff] involves matters of public concern, [his] com-
plaint can only be sustained if it alleges that [the publisher defendant] acted with ‘actual malice’ in 
publishing it.  That is, . . . with knowledge that it contains false statements of fact, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth.”).  There are numerous other examples of plaintiffs employing the actual-
malice standard as a shield against the right of publicity.  See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 
F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that a publisher may be liable under the right of publicity 
if it knowingly or recklessly “falsely claim[s] that the public figure endorses that news medium”); 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d on other 
grounds, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff cannot establish a triable issue with 
respect to actual malice, . . . Plaintiff cannot sustain her claim for misappropriation of the right to 
publicity.”); Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (con-
cluding that “a defendant publisher may assert that the actual malice standard applies to claims for 
commercial misappropriation”); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 793 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that a documentary featuring a well-known surfer was “constitutionally pro-
tected in the absence of a showing that the publishers knew that their statements were false or pub-
lished them in reckless disregard of the truth”); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, No. ED 78785, 2002 WL 
1610972, at *14 (Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002), rev’d, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (“Before [the 
plaintiff] can recover on his right of publicity claim he must, therefore, satisfy the New York Times 
‘actual malice’ standard, knowledge that the statements are false or in reckless disregard of their 
truth.”). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for instance, 
required a showing of actual malice when actor Dustin Hoffman sued a mag-
azine that altered a photo of him from the movie Tootsie as part of a compo-
site of celebrities sporting the latest fashion trends.181  Hoffman’s photo ap-
peared in an article entitled Grand Illusions, for which the magazine had 
“used computer technology to alter famous film stills to make it appear that 
the actors were wearing Spring 1997 fashions.”182  In the original photo from 
Tootsie, Hoffman had been wearing a red sequined dress, but the magazine 
modified the image to put him in a different designer gown.183  When ana-
lyzing Hoffman’s claim under California’s right of publicity, the court ex-
plained that, because Hoffman was a public figure, he had to show actual 
malice—that is, he had to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
the magazine “intended to create the false impression in the minds of its read-
ers that when they saw the altered ‘Tootsie’ photograph they were seeing 
Hoffman’s body.”184  Because the court concluded that Hoffman could not 
satisfy that burden, the First Amendment barred his claim.185 
Although the magazine was ultimately successful in rebuffing Hoff-
man’s claim in that appeal, the decision in the district court—and even the 
analysis in the court of appeals—shows that victory was far from certain.186  
The district court explained that the magazine “fabricated” the photo and 
published it “knowing it was false.”187  By “false,” the court meant that the 
magazine knew that Hoffman had “never worn the designer clothes he was 
depicted as wearing” and that it was “not even his body” in the photo.188  
These findings were, of course, factually correct—the magazine had pur-
posefully edited the photo to replace Hoffman’s body and change his attire, 
as it had done with the other celebrities in the composite.189  Because the 
magazine admitted that “it intended to create the false impression in the 
minds of the public that they were seeing Mr. Hoffman’s body,” the district 
court held that Hoffman had shown actual malice and, as a result, the First 
Amendment offered no defense against the right of publicity.190  The court of 
appeals reversed only after engaging in a fact-intensive inquiry about whether 
                                                          
 181.  Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 182.  Id. at 1183. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 1187. 
 185.  Id. at 1189. 
 186.  Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873–75 (C.D. Cal. 
1999), rev’d, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89. 
 187.  Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 875. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89. 
 190.  Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the magazine’s editors had knowingly or recklessly misled readers into be-
lieving that Hoffman had actually posed for the photo.191  Thus, although the 
courts asked different falsity-related questions, they both conditioned consti-
tutional protection on whether the magazine had knowingly or recklessly 
conveyed false information to the public by publishing an intentionally fic-
tionalized photo. 
Where movie star Dustin Hoffmann failed, baseball player Warren 
Spahn prevailed.  In a case brought against the author of a fiction-infused 
book that featured Spahn, New York’s highest court applied the actual-mal-
ice standard to decide whether the author violated Spahn’s publicity rights.192  
The author admitted that he had “fictionalized and dramatized” aspects of 
Spahn’s life so that the book would appeal to “a juvenile readership.”193  This 
included “imaginary incidents, manufactured dialogue and a manipulated 
chronology,”194 all of which the author insisted were important and common 
“literary techniques” of the genre.195  Yet it was these very techniques—“in-
vented dialogue, imaginary incidents, and attributed thoughts and feel-
ings”—that the court declared were sufficient to show actual malice.196  The 
court explained that a public figure seeking recovery for “unauthorized 
presentation of his life” must show “that the presentation is infected with 
material and substantial falsification and that the work was published with 
knowledge of such falsification or with a reckless disregard for the truth.”197  
One passage in particular reveals how the court turned the book’s intentional 
dramatization against the author: 
Exactly how it may be argued that the “all-pervasive” use of imag-
inary incidents—incidents which the author knew did not take 
place—invented dialogue—dialogue which the author knew had 
never occurred—and attributed thoughts and feelings—thoughts 
and feelings which were likewise the figment of the author’s im-
agination—can be said not to constitute knowing falsity is not 
made clear by the defendants.  Indeed, the arguments made here 
are, in essence, not a denial of knowing falsity but a justification 
for it.198 
This actual-malice inquiry in Spahn shows the limited protection that 
this educative defense provides to creators of expressive works that feature 
fictional elements.  The court chastised the author for his lack of “research 
                                                          
 191.  Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89. 
 192.  Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E. 2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1967). 
 193.  Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 454 (App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 221 N.E. 2d 
543 (N.Y. 1966), vacated sub nom. Julian Messner, Inc. v. Spahn., 387 U.S. 239 (1967). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  See Spahn, 233 N.E. 2d at 842. 
 196.  Id.  
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id.  
 928 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:899 
effort” after he “admitted that he never interviewed Mr. Spahn, any member 
of his family, or any baseball player who knew Spahn,” and that he “did not 
even attempt to obtain information from the Milwaukee Braves, the team for 
which Mr. Spahn toiled for almost two decades.”199  The court had already 
alluded to these failings in educative terms in an earlier opinion in the same 
litigation, explaining that “[n]o public interest is served by protecting the dis-
semination” of fictional works, which are “quite different” from “[t]he free 
speech which is encouraged and essential to the operation of a healthy gov-
ernment.”200  In other words, the court faulted the author for failing to ascer-
tain—and then convey—truthful and actual information about Spahn to the 
public. 
3. State-Law “Newsworthiness” and “Public Interest” Exceptions 
Educative theory has also influenced publicity claims through state-law 
exceptions for portrayals that are “newsworthy” or in “the public interest.”201  
Defendants may raise these exceptions as a defense that is distinct from any 
First Amendment argument they might make, for the two protections are not 
necessarily coextensive.202  Although courts often rely on First Amendment 
principles in construing these exceptions, their application is a matter of state 
law.203 
Where states have recognized common-law publicity rights, courts have 
often crafted judicial exceptions for newsworthy uses.204  The Georgia Su-
preme Court adopted such an exception for portrayals related to “an incident 
                                                          
 199.  Id. at 843. 
 200.  Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E. 2d 543, 546 (N.Y. 1966). 
 201.  See Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 923 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“In recognition 
of the potential clash between the First Amendment and the right of publicity, courts and legislators 
carve out a public affairs or newsworthiness exception to the right.”); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that “[p]ublication of matters in the 
public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know, and the freedom of the press to tell it, 
cannot ordinarily be actionable,” and thus speech on “a matter of public concern . . . would generally 
preclude the imposition of liability” under the right of publicity). 
 202.  See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309–10, 310 n.10 
(9th Cir. 1992) (noting that California’s Section 334(d) “public affairs” exception to the right of 
publicity “is not coextensive with the First Amendment” but rather “is designed to avoid First 
Amendment questions . . . by providing extra breathing space for the use of a person’s name in 
connection with matters of public interest”). 
 203.  Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 
724 F.3d 1268, 1282 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that California’s common-law and statutory excep-
tions “are based on First Amendment concerns” but “are not coextensive with the Federal Consti-
tution,” and so “their application is thus a matter of state law” (citations omitted)). 
 204.  Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *9 (S.D.W. Va. 
Feb. 19, 2008) (“Courts have engrafted exceptions and restrictions to the rights of publicity and 
privacy in order to ‘avoid any conflict with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy 
events, and matters of public interest,’ guaranteed by the First Amendment.” (quoting Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967))); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Courts have been consistently unwilling to recognize the right of 
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[that] is a matter of public interest, or the subject matter of a public investi-
gation.”205  Many states now guarantee similar exceptions by statute.206  In-
diana law, for example, exempts portrayals in “[m]aterial that has political or 
newsworthy value”207 and “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of 
an event or a topic of general or public interest.”208 
In California—a state where celebrity plaintiffs often seek to enforce 
publicity rights—statutory and common-law exceptions exist to serve educa-
tive ends.  As a statutory matter, the right of publicity does not apply to por-
trayals connected to “any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, 
or any political campaign.”209  And under California’s common-law “public 
interest” defense, “no cause of action will lie for the publication of matters in 
the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know and the 
freedom of the press to tell it.”210  Some courts have suggested that this de-
fense is limited in scope, extending only to “reporting of recent events.”211  
Other courts, however, have stressed that the defense is “not limited to news 
stories on current events” because “[e]ntertainment features receive the same 
constitutional protection as factual news reports.”212 
                                                          
publicity cause of action where the plaintiff’s name or picture was used in connection with a matter 
of public interest.”). 
 205.  Waters v. Fleetwood, 91 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ga. 1956); see also Somerson v. World Wres-
tling Entm’t, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“The right to publicity is in tension 
with freedoms of speech and the press guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion . . . .  In order to carefully balance these rights against the right of publicity, the Georgia courts 
have adopted a ‘newsworthiness’ exception to the right of publicity.”). 
 206.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-761, 13-3726 (2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 
(West 2017); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/35 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, 
§ 3A (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.09 (Lex-
isNexis 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449 
(West 2017); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8316(e)(2) (2017); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012 (West 
2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.070 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 2017). 
 207.  IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(B) (2017). 
 208.  Id. § 32-36-1-1(c)(3). 
 209.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(j) (2017). 
 210.  Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 912 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Montana v. San Jose 
Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
 211.  Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 212.  Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 681 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Gion-
friddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Ct. App. 2001)); see also Dryer v. 
Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1198 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d, 814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 
2016) (explaining that, under Texas law, the “newsworthiness defense” is “broad and extends be-
yond subjects of political or public affairs to all matters of the kind customarily regarded as ‘news’ 
and all matters giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlighten-
ment, where the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is pub-
lished”); Edme v. Internet Brands, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining that, 
under New York law, “‘newsworthiness’ is applied broadly . . . and includes not only descriptions 
of actual events, but also articles concerning political happenings, social trends or any subject of 
public interest”); Arenas v. Shed Media U.S. Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1191–92 (C.D. Cal. 2011), 
aff’d, 462 F. App’x 709 (9th Cir. 2011); Nichols v. Moore, 334 F. Supp. 2d 944, 956 (E.D. Mich. 
2004) (explaining that courts in various jurisdictions “have been consistently unwilling to recognize 
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In a prominent case involving the application of these state-law excep-
tions to expressive works, the Ninth Circuit in Keller v. Electronic Arts, 
Inc.213 adopted a cramped interpretation of California’s exceptions and con-
cluded that they did not apply to a videogame featuring real-life college ath-
letes playing in games that had never actually occurred.214  Although the 
court acknowledged that California law provides that the right of publicity 
does not apply to “newsworthy items” and “matters in the public interest,” 
the court held that the videogame’s creators could be liable because the vid-
eogame did not involve the “publication or reporting” of “factual infor-
mation” or “factual data.”215  The court explained that the videogame “is a 
means by which users can play their own virtual football games, not a means 
for obtaining information about real-world football games.”216  Although the 
videogame’s creators had incorporated “actual player information”—such as 
the players’ real heights and weights—their invocation of the state-law ex-
ceptions was “considerably weakened” because they failed to include the 
players’ names alongside their likenesses and statistical data.217  The court 
held that the exceptions did not apply because the videogame “is not a pub-
lication of facts about college football; it is a game, not a reference source.”218  
In short, the videogame served no informative function and thus served no 
educative end. 
A federal district court in Ohio sang a similar tune in Bosley v. 
Wildwett.com,219 where the court narrowly construed the statutory exceptions 
under Ohio and Florida law in a case involving a renowned television news 
anchor videotaped at a wet t-shirt contest.220  The court granted the news an-
chor’s request to enjoin a website from making the footage available online, 
holding that the state-law exceptions did not apply because the footage did 
not “contain any editorial content” and was “not accompanied by any dialog 
discussing Plaintiff’s status as a former news anchor.”221  Likewise, in 
                                                          
the right of publicity cause of action where the plaintiff’s name or picture was used in connection 
with a matter of public interest, be it news or entertainment”). 
 213.  724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 214.  Id. at 1282–83.  
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
 220.  Id. at 921 (“A use of an aspect of an individual’s persona in connection with any news, 
public affairs, sports broadcast, or account does not constitute a use for which consent is required.” 
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 2741.02(D)(1))); id. (“The provisions of this section shall not apply to: 
(a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any person in any newspaper, 
magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other news medium or publication as part of any 
bona fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such 
name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes.” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 540.08)). 
 221.  Id. at 927. 
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Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,222 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the exception under 
Oklahoma law “provide[d] no haven” for portrayals of professional baseball 
players on parody trading cards.223  The court recognized that the cards were 
“commentary on an important social institution” and “provide[d] social com-
mentary on public figures,” but it nonetheless held that the exception did not 
apply because the players’ likenesses were not used “in connection with any 
news account.”224 
Finally, even when courts have recognized that an expressive work re-
lates to public issues, these state-law exemptions do not necessarily provide 
a defense if the plaintiff’s identity was used in a “knowingly false manner.”225  
As a result, in Browne v. McCain,226 the federal district court rejected presi-
dential candidate John McCain’s motion to dismiss a publicity claim against 
a singer, Jackson Browne, whose song McCain’s campaign used in a political 
commercial.227  The court accepted that Browne’s voice was “sufficiently 
distinctive and widely known” that the use of his song “could constitute use 
of his identity.”228  Because Browne had not given McCain permission to use 
the song, he argued that using it implied an endorsement of McCain’s candi-
dacy, when in fact Browne had been a strong supporter of Barack Obama.229  
The court allowed Browne’s claim to proceed.230 
4. Judicial Construction of Tort Elements 
The final influence that educative theory has had on the right of public-
ity comes through judicial interpretation of the tort’s elements.  Several 
courts have fretted over the constitutional implications of broad publicity 
rights.231  To assuage these concerns, they have narrowly construed elements 
to avoid liability for speech about matters of public concern.232 
                                                          
 222.  95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).  
 223.  Id. at 968 (explaining that Oklahoma’s “news” exception “exempts use of a person’s iden-
tity in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political 
campaign, from the dictates of the statute” (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1449(D))). 
 224.  Id. at 968–69.  The court ultimately concluded for separate reasons that the cards were 
protected under the First Amendment.  See id. at 968–76.  
 225.  Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Solano v. Playgirl, 
Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Solano, 292 F.3d at 1089 (holding that “the 
newsworthiness privileges do not apply where a defendant uses a plaintiff’s name and likeness in a 
knowingly false manner to increase sales of the publication”). 
 226.  611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 227.  Id. at 1065.  
 228.  Id. at 1070. 
 229.  Id. at 1065, 1067. 
 230.  Id. at 1073.  
 231.  Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (Sup. Ct. 1968), 
aff’d, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969). 
 232.  Id. 
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For example, under New York law, the unauthorized portrayal must be 
for “the purposes of trade” for there to be liability.233  New York courts have 
long recognized “[t]he dominance of the public interest in obtaining infor-
mation about public figures” and have construed the statute’s “trade” element 
accordingly.234  Thus, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, 
Inc.,235 the New York Supreme Court explained that “[t]he publication of a 
newspaper, magazine, or book which imparts truthful news or other factual 
information to the public does not fall within ‘the purposes of trade’ contem-
plated by the New York statute . . . .”236  Similarly, in Paulsen v. Personality 
Posters, Inc.,237 the court noted that “dissemination of news or information 
concerning matters of public interest” does not constitute a use for “the pur-
poses of trade.”238 
Despite this sweeping language in favor of free speech, these narrowing 
constructions have been used against creators of expressive works that con-
tain fictional elements.  New York’s highest court has stressed that a work 
“may be so infected with fiction, dramatization or embellishment that it can-
not be said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception.”239  In 
Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America,240 the defendant produced a film based 
                                                          
 233.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019). 
 234.  Rosemont Enters., Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d at 127, 129. 
 235.  Id. at 127.  
 236.  Id. at 128–29 (“Because of [First Amendment] considerations, a public figure can have no 
exclusive rights to his own life story, and others need no consent or permission of the subject to 
write a biography of a celebrity.”); see also Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing 
& Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000) (explaining that, under New York law, “a newsworthy 
article is not deemed produced for the purposes of advertising or trade”); Gautier v. Pro-Football, 
Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952) (“It has long been recognized that the use of name or picture 
in a newspaper, magazine, or newsreel, in connection with an item of news or one that is newswor-
thy, is not a use for purposes of trade within the meaning of the [New York] Civil Rights Law.”). 
 237.  299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).  
 238.  Id. at 506.  In a sense, the statutory state-law exceptions discussed in the previous subsec-
tion are a legislative analog to the judicial carve outs discussed in this subsection.  See, e.g., William 
O’Neil & Co. v. Validea.com Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that, 
under California statutory law, “a use of a name, photograph or likeness in connection with any 
news . . . shall not constitute a use for purposes of advertising or solicitation”); Eastwood v. Superior 
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that, under California common law, if a 
use falls within the statutory “news” exception, it is not actionable under common law because 
“[p]ublication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know, and 
the freedom of the press to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable”). 
 239.  Messenger ex rel. Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 555.  This rule also applies to discussion of 
real people in newspaper articles.  In 1937, in Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. 
Ct. 1937), the New York Supreme Court explained that an unauthorized use would not be for “pur-
poses of trade”—and, accordingly, would be protected by the newsworthiness doctrine—if it was 
connected to “an article of current news or immediate public interest,” but the use would lose pro-
tection under the doctrine if paired with an “article of fiction.”  Id. at 388–89.  If an article’s contents 
were “neither strictly news items nor strictly fictional in character,” the court announced that the 
“general rule” was that the use was protected by the newsworthiness doctrine if the articles were 
“educational and informative in character.”  Id. at 389. 
 240.  103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913). 
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on true events about a wireless operator whose heroics helped rescue passen-
gers from a shipwrecked boat.241  The real wireless operator sued the 
filmmaker for portraying him without his permission.242  The court recog-
nized that the film was “mainly a product of the imagination,” even though it 
was based “largely upon such information relating to [the] actual occurrence 
as could readily be obtained.”243  This finding was fatal for the filmmaker.  
Although truthfully “recounting or portraying an actual current event” would 
be protected, the court explained that this film was designed to “amuse” the 
audience rather than to “instruct or educate” them.244  Later courts have but-
tressed this distinction by emphasizing that the protection for a “newsworthy” 
portrayal of a public figure “does not extend to commercialization of his per-
sonality through a form of treatment distinct from the dissemination of news 
or information.”245 
Similarly, in Hicks v. Casablanca Records,246 the heir and assignees of 
mystery writer Agatha Christie sought to enjoin the distribution of the film 
and book Agatha.247  The federal district court ruled that the works were fic-
tional and not biographical, and that the inclusion of some “facts” did not 
make the works “newsworthy.”248  This kind of educative reasoning, whereby 
creators of expressive works are denied protection when their work does not 
inform the public about actual events, remains influential to this day.  Just 
last year, a New York appellate court revived a claim against the filmmakers 
of Romeo Killer: The Christopher Porco Story.249  Christopher Porco, who 
had been convicted of murdering his father and attempting to murder his 
mother, alleged that the film was a “knowing and substantially fictionalized 
account” of his life.250  That allegation alone defeated the argument that the 
film was entitled to the protection for “reports of newsworthy events or mat-
ters of public interest.”251 
                                                          
 241.  Id. at 1109.  
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. at 1110. 
 244.  Id. at 1110–11. 
 245.  Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952); see also Redmond v. Co-
lumbia Pictures Corp., 14 N.E.2d 636, 636–37 (N.Y. 1938); Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 98 N.Y.S.2d 
233, 234–35 (App. Div. 1950); Franklin v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 96, 96–98 (App. 
Div. 1935), aff’d, 2 N.E.2d 691 (1936). 
 246.  464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 247.  Id. at 427, 431. 
 248.  Id.at 427. 
 249.  Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC, 47 N.Y.S.3d 769, 770–72 (App. Div. 2017). 
 250.  Id. at 1255. 
 251.  See id. at 1254 (quoting Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 
727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000)). 
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C. Why Trump Might Win 
The four defenses discussed above suffer from the same limitation that 
plagues educative theory more generally: the premise that the speaker’s value 
is contingent on his ability to inform the listener.  My qualm is not with the 
idea that creating an informed public capable of self-government is an un-
worthy goal, but rather with the mandate that speech serve a narrow informa-
tive function in order to gain protection.  This emphasis undervalues speak-
ers’ expressive interests and encourages politico-centric elitism.  There are, 
of course, some portrayals of real people in expressive works that advance 
educative goals, or at least one could tell a plausible story for why they do.  
But as we have seen, educative defenses have offered incomplete and, at 
times, unpersuasive protection against the right of publicity.  This leaves cre-
ators of expressive works vulnerable when they portray real people. 
To hone in on why educative defenses are ill-suited to protect expressive 
works against publicity claims, some examples will be useful.  There is no 
need for hypotheticals—as luck would have it, two interesting publicity prob-
lems have been offered by the same person: Donald Trump. 
In 2011, when Trump was a real-estate magnate, reality-television ce-
lebrity, and billionaire, but not yet a candidate for political office, rapper Mac 
Miller released a song titled “Donald Trump.”252  Miller rapped about his 
plans to “[t]ake over the world” while “on [his] Donald Trump shit,” encour-
aging us to “[l]ook at all this money” because “[a]in’t that some shit?”253  
Trump took umbrage at the use of his name, implying on Twitter that Miller 
had violated his right of publicity: 
 Little @MacMiller —I don’t need your praise . . . just pay me 
the money you owe.254 
 Little @MacMiller, you illegally used my name for your song 
‘Donald Trump’ which now has over 75 million hits.255 
 Little @MacMiller, I want the money not the plaque you gave 
me!256 
 Little @MacMiller, I’m now going to teach you a big boy lesson 
about lawsuits and finance.  You ungrateful dog!257 
                                                          
 252.  Dave Gilson, Most Presidents Ignore Products That Rip off Their Names. Will Trump?, 
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/02/trump-name-pub-
licity-rights/. 
 253.  Mac Miller, Donald Trump, on BEST DAY EVER (Rostrum Records, LLC 2011). 
 254.  Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 10:09 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297043874369650688. 
 255.  Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:45 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297083228706201600. 
 256.  Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:50 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297084584334589952. 
 257.  Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 1:03 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297087613851017216. 
 2019] DRAWING TRUMP NAKED 935 
Miller’s song was not Trump’s only experience with his identity being 
used in an expressive work.  As we saw earlier, Illma Gore’s Make America 
Great Again painting prompted Trump to threaten Gore with a lawsuit.258 
These two examples provide insight into the perils of relying on educa-
tive defenses to shield expressive works.  Artists like Miller and Gore might 
have had reason to worry.259  As we have seen, educative defenses pose prob-
lems for creators of expressive works for two main reasons.  First, by focus-
ing on the rights of listeners to receive information, they give short shrift to 
the expressive interests of speakers.  Second, they invite politico-centric elit-
ism that valorizes speech about politics and supposedly “serious” public is-
sues and undervalues popular culture.  Even if the defenses could fend off 
Trump’s publicity claims, the arguments that Miller and Gore would have 
had to make in the process could imperil other creators of expressive works 
whose claims to educative protection are more tenuous. 
As the cases discussed in the previous section reveal, creators of expres-
sive works who invoke educative defenses usually prevail only if their works 
convey information that courts consider to be valuable for democratic delib-
eration.260  This can be a tough standard to meet for expressive works—par-
ticularly those that are fictional, abstract, or nonverbal.  That is not to say it 
is impossible.  But when serious consequences can result from liability,261 an 
unclear and unpredictable standard will have a chilling effect. 
Consider Miller’s rap: “Take over the world when I’m on my Donald 
Trump shit /Look at all this money!  Ain’t that some shit?”262  Miller uses 
Trump’s name not as a way to impart any information about Trump, except 
perhaps that Miller saw Trump as a figure synonymous with success.  The 
song was written years before Trump became president, and the lyrics sug-
gest no connection to a particular political or public issue.  At most, then, the 
                                                          
 258.  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.  Unfortunately, Gore’s painting could not be 
reprinted here for publication-related reasons, but its omission should not be construed as diminish-
ing Gore’s talent or the painting’s majesty.  For those eager to feast their eyes on the masterpiece, 
the internet is a wonderful place.  See Make America Great Again, ILLMA GORE, http://illma-
gore.com/work-1/#/798817030644/ (last visited June 7, 2019). 
 259.  For a delightful assortment of Trump-related advertisements that might raise concerns un-
der the right of publicity, see Mark Duffy, President Trump, Negative Advertising Linchpin, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 20, 2019), https://medium.com/@copyranter/https-medium-com-copyranter-presi-
dent-trump-negative-advertising-linchpin-f8402e7923b1 (cataloguing the ads and noting that 
“Trump has been used to sell everything from the Salvation Army to Sushi to toner cartridges”).  
Not only are none of the over fifty brand ads featuring Trump “official,” but “almost all of them 
have used him in a negative light.”  Id.  Given Trump’s history of litigating unflattering portrayals, 
the makers of these ads might want to consult their lawyers. 
 260.  See supra Section II.B. 
 261.  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 262. Miller, supra note 253. 
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use of Trump’s name serves as a “common point[] of reference”263 or “sym-
bol[]”264 for wealth.  That is how Miller saw it, too.  When explaining why 
he chose to invoke Trump’s name, he said that Trump “was just somebody 
who symbolized financial success to everybody at that time,”265 and that the 
line could have easily been “Take over the world when I’m on my Bill Gates 
shit.”266  Any educative rationale is thin. 
As for Gore’s painting, it is again difficult (though not impossible) to 
credibly assert that it conveys information that the public needs to make po-
litical decisions.  Gore says that Make America Great Again was created to 
evoke a reaction from its audience, good or bad, about the significance we 
place on our physical selves.”267  She continued: “One should not feel emas-
culated by their penis size or vagina, as it does not define who you are. Your 
genitals do not define your gender, your power, or your status.”268  If we take 
Gore’s word for it, her painting was not directly tied to Trump’s candidacy 
for the presidency, nor was it supposed to convey accurate information about 
him.  Rather, Gore used Trump’s image as a way to comment on the role that 
a physical characteristic can have on our conceptions of ourselves. 
It is conceivable, of course, that a court would protect Miller and Gore 
under one of the educative defenses.  Even before Trump ran for office, he 
was a public figure with considerable influence in the business world, and 
Miller’s rap is, in some sense, a commentary about that influence.  And alt-
hough Gore’s painting does not explicitly critique Trump’s candidacy, titling 
it with the campaign’s motto—“Make America Great Again”269—obviously 
entangles it with his political persona.  But we could also imagine Trump 
citing cases like Keller to argue that neither the rap nor the painting was a 
                                                          
 263.  JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN 
THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 (1990) (characterizing celebrities as “common points of 
reference for millions of individuals who may never interact with one another, but who share, by 
virtue of their participation in a mediated culture, a common experience and a collective memory”); 
see also Marshall McLuhan, Sight, Sound, and the Fury, in MASS CULTURE: THE POPULAR ARTS 
IN AMERICA 489, 495 (Bernard Rosenberg & David M. White eds., 1957) (referring to celebrities 
as “points of collective awareness and communication”). 
 264.  RICHARD SCHICKEL, INTIMATE STRANGERS: THE CULTURE OF CELEBRITY viii (1985) 
(characterizing celebrities as a “principal source of motive power in putting across ideas of every 
kind—social, political, aesthetic, moral,” and as “symbols for these ideas”). 
 265.  Kia Makarechi, Mac Miller, Donald Trump’s Least Favorite Rapper, Revisits Feud, 
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/01/mac-miller-donald-
trump-feud. 
 266.  Lauren Nostro, Donald Trump Threatens Mac Miller with Lawsuit, Calls Him an “Un-
grateful Dog,” COMPLEX (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.complex.com/music/2013/01/donald-trump-
threatens-to-sue-mac-miller. 
 267.  Make America Great Again, ILLMA GORE, http://illmagore.com/work-1/#/798817030644/ 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  About, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/about/ (last 
visited June 7, 2019).  
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“publication or reporting” of “factual information” or “factual data,”270 or 
citing Binns to claim that the works were “mainly a product of the imagina-
tion” that were designed to “amuse” rather than to “instruct or educate” the 
public.271  Trump could quote from Bosley to highlight that neither work 
“contain[s] any editorial content” or “dialog discussing [his] status” as a busi-
ness mogul or political candidate.272  He could even concede that the works 
constituted “commentary on an important social institution” and “commen-
tary on public figures,” as the court did in Cardtoons, and yet still maintain 
that Miller and Gore are liable because they did not use his name and likeness 
“in connection with any news account.”273  And, at the risk of being salacious, 
Trump might even contend that Gore’s painting is unprotected because it cre-
ates a “false impression” about certain aspects of his physique.274 
Setting aside the real-world Trump examples for a moment, imagine if 
an aspiring novelist wanted to publish a fictional book about corruption in 
Atlantic City in the 1990s.  One of the novelist’s characters, Ronald Grump, 
owns a hotel and casino in the city called Grump Plaza. Grump is a sympa-
thetic character, though he is prone to embarrassing gaffes, and his competi-
tors like to gossip about his odd hairdo.  There is even a suspicion that he 
wears a toupee.  What would happen if Trump heard about the book’s im-
pending publication and wanted to stop it? 
The educative defenses might not do the author much good.  She has 
evoked Trump’s “identity”275 in an expressive work that entwines fact and 
fiction.  Because educative defenses rest chiefly on truth telling, they are ill 
equipped to challenge publicity claims that target works that intentionally 
avoid literal truth.276  As we saw in Hicks, even the inclusion of some facts 
                                                          
 270.  See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 271.  See Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 103 N.E. 1108, 1110–11 (N.Y. 1913); see also Post, 
supra note 89, at 1007 (noting that “[s]ome courts confine the sphere of legitimate public concern 
to information that is . . . ‘decontextualized,’ so that they ‘distinguish between fictionalization and 
dramatization on the one hand and dissemination of news and information on the other’” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 272.  See Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
 273.  Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968–69 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
 274.  See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1967).  Trump certainly hasn’t been shy 
about rebuffing insinuations about the size of his nether regions.  See Emily Crockett, Donald Trump 
Just Defended His Penis Size at the Republican Debate, VOX (Mar. 3, 2016), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/3/3/11158910/trump-penis-republican-debate-fox (quoting Trump stat-
ing, “Look at those hands.  Are they small hands?  And he referred to my hands—if they’re small, 
something else must be small.  I guarantee you there’s no problem, I guarantee.”).  
 275.  Even though the book does not use Trump’s name, the Grump character certainly falls 
within the “identity” that some courts have recognized is protected by the right of publicity.  See, 
e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 276.  See Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 555 
(N.Y. 2000) (explaining that an expressive work “may be so infected with fiction, dramatization or 
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might not be enough to make the book newsworthy.277  And depending on 
how far the story strayed from reality, Trump could argue—as the plaintiff 
did in Porco—that it constituted a “knowing and substantially fictionalized 
account” of his life that merits no protection.278 
This kind of quasi-fictional work might also run afoul of the actual-mal-
ice standard that courts like Hoffman and Spahn applied to publicity 
claims.279  The standard first asks whether the work contains a false statement 
of fact or creates a “false impression” about the person being portrayed.280  
Fiction stands in contrast to fact.  As Chief Justice Bird of the Supreme Court 
of California once noted: 
[T]he author who denotes his work as fiction proclaims his literary 
license and indifference to “the facts.”  There is no pretense.  All 
fiction, by definition, eschews an obligation to be faithful to his-
torical truth.  Every fiction writer knows his creation is in some 
sense “false.”  That is the nature of the art.281 
Once falsity is established, courts ask whether the speaker showed a 
“reckless disregard” for the truth,282 meaning that she told a “known lie” or 
“calculated falsehood.”283  Again, these standards clash with the intentional 
use of untruth when creating a fictitious world starring real people.284  As the 
dissenting judge in Spahn cautioned: 
                                                          
embellishment that it cannot be said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception”); Sarat 
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v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 875 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev’d, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th 
Cir. 2001); see also Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1967). 
 281.  Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring); 
see also de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 646 (Ct. App. 2018) (“When 
the expressive work at issue is fiction, or a combination of fact and fiction, the ‘actual malice’ 
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 282.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 283.  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
 284.  There might be further confusion created by applying the actual-malice standard to some 
fiction: the requirement that the person being portrayed show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the false statement be “of and concerning” him.  See Doe v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., No. ED 78785, 
2002 WL 1610972, at *15 (Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002), rev’d, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (“Even 
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is meant to portray, in actual fact, Twist the hockey player, acting as described.”). 
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To a fictionalized account of a public figure it is difficult to apply 
precisely the criteria of [actual malice].  All fiction is false in the 
literal sense that it is imagined rather than actual.  It is, of course, 
“calculated” because the author knows he is writing fiction and not 
fact; and it is more than a “reckless” disregard for truth.  Fiction is 
the conscious antithesis of truth.285 
The Spahn court’s puzzling demand that expressive works avoid all fal-
sity points to a deeper issue created by applying educative theory in this con-
text: expressive works are often susceptible to many meanings.  This compli-
cates matters on two fronts: not only can it be difficult to determine what 
“information” a work is conveying to the public, but it is also unclear what 
“truth” even means in this context, let alone why it should be required.  As 
Professor Steven Shiffrin has remarked: “[T]he idea that literature’s claim to 
[F]irst [A]mendment protection depends upon its relevance to political life 
simply does not ring true.  The notion that the classics of literature cannot be 
suppressed solely because of their relevance to voter decisionmaking bears 
all the earmarks of pure fiction.”286  This might explain why the Supreme 
Court has referenced expressive works to explain why “a narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection.”287  The 
Court has rejected the idea that the First Amendment is “confined to expres-
sions conveying a ‘particularized message’” because that would mean pro-
tection “would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Car-
roll.”288  Indeed, as the Court has explained:  
Most of what we say to one another lacks “religious, political, sci-
entific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value” (let 
alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government reg-
ulation.  Even “[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the pro-
tection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s ser-
mons.”289   
These pronouncements are at odds with an educative theory of free speech: 
if the constitutional touchstone is the ability of speech to inform the public, 
one might think that a “particularized message” is necessary to help voters 
understand what is being said.  The Court’s rejection of that standard—and 
its embrace of Pollock’s paint splatters—are telling.290 
                                                          
 285.  Spahn, 233 N.E.2d at 845 (Bergan, J., dissenting). 
 286.  STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 48 (1990). 
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Separate from the inherent difficulty of discerning the informational 
benefit that an expressive work can provide, educative theory also risks un-
dervaluing expressive works that relate to issues that have not (yet) captured 
the public’s attention.  This is particularly the case when newsworthiness is 
framed as a descriptive standard—when what counts is whether, as an em-
pirical matter, the public generally knows or cares about the subject at is-
sue.291  Under this descriptive standard, there might be no protection for 
works that expose a previously unknown phenomenon, such as a yet-to-be-
publicized wave of teenage suicides.292  Particularly with subversive expres-
sive works, there might be a protection lag between when people are first 
confronted with a topic and when it attracts enough awareness to qualify as 
something of public concern, yet this moment of limbo might be when pro-
tection is needed most. 
Finally, the diverse and inconsistent ways in which educative defenses 
have been interpreted by the courts in publicity jurisprudence creates confu-
sion for creators of expressive works.  The standards differ across jurisdic-
tions; courts waver between broadly and narrowly construing the defenses; 
and some courts implement statutory exceptions, while others create ad-hoc 
privileges based on particular facts.293  Many expressive works aspire to have 
national reach, but that can be perilous when the protection they receive fluc-
tuates across state lines—especially when a nationwide injunction is among 
the possible remedies for successful publicity claims.294  In all, then, there 
are many reasons why educative defenses provide limited protection for ex-
pressive works that portray real people. 
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some might place sculptures, prints, and T-shirts.  The First Amendment protects your 
right to wear a jacket with a three-word slogan; your right to display a sign containing 
just the words “For Peace in the Gulf”; your right to display symbols, such as black arm-
bands or burning flags, that convey a fairly simple (and often not even very precisely 
defined) message; and your right to create purely abstract works, such as abstract art, 
instrumental music, or absurdist poetry that don’t convey many ideas at all. 
Volokh, supra note 32, at 909–10 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25–26; City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 
U.S. 43, 54–55 (1994); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)); see also Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amend-
ment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1304–05 (1976) (arguing that the right of publicity should not apply 
to fictional works); James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal 
Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 660 (1973) (arguing that fictional works should be immune from 
liability under the right of publicity because of the First Amendment). 
 291.  POST, supra note 4, at 164; see also BERNARD C. HENNESSY, PUBLIC OPINION 8–9 (3d ed. 
1975). 
 292.  See POST, supra note 4, at 168. 
 293.  See supra Section II.B. 
 294.  See Siddique, supra note 23, at 2115–16; Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 
935 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
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III. WHAT’S THE SOLUTION? 
Having diagnosed the problems with educative defenses, let us return to 
the idea of public discourse to see if a different framework might work better.  
This Part begins by exploring how publicity rights interfere with participation 
in public discourse.  It then considers several approaches that courts and leg-
islatures have used to curb publicity rights and protect speakers’ rights to 
create expressive works, concluding that none are responsive to the dynamics 
of public discourse.  It ends by proposing a new approach and sketching how 
courts might use it to address some of the toughest and most topical issues 
raised by publicity rights. 
A. Why Trump (Probably) Should Not Win 
Expressive works deserve more than parasitic protection based on their 
ability to convey useful information to voters.  They deserve protection be-
cause, regardless of their informational impact on listeners, they enable the 
formation of public opinion.  This feature makes expressive works part of 
public discourse and thus should presumptively grant them constitutional 
protection, even if they portray real people without permission.  Under the 
First Amendment, only certain justifications suffice to limit the content of 
public discourse.  Speakers have wide latitude to choose the form and content 
of their speech in public discourse, where they are subject only to narrow 
restrictions.  In the context of publicity rights, this means that—contrary to 
the current state of the doctrine—the mere use of a person’s name or likeness 
in public discourse should rarely provide a basis for liability. 
Speakers’ rights to create expressive works form an essential part of 
participation in public discourse.  These works help cultivate the warranted 
belief that government is responsive to its citizens, which is essential to the 
project of democratic self-government.  They also enable processes of mutual 
influence through which we shape political and cultural power.  As Post has 
argued, an important dimension of public discourse is the “wide circulation 
of ‘similar social stimuli’” to help make “common experiences available to 
those who would otherwise remain unconnected strangers.”295  This process 
occurs through various means, but expressive works are a crucial part of the 
“structural skeleton” of public discourse that allows democratic society to 
function.296 
On their face, publicity rights could impede the creation of expressive 
works and thus restrict our ability to participate in public discourse.  This is 
especially so when powerful cultural figures assert these rights, as is often 
                                                          
 295.  Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1276 
(1995) (quoting JOHN W. BENNET & MELVIN M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
140 (1952)). 
 296.  Id. 
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the case.  The right of publicity challenges popular participation in culture by 
granting each of us an exclusive right to permit or refuse our portrayal by 
others.  This exclusive right is worrying on at least two dimensions, both of 
which relate to the power that culture has to shape our lives and societies.  
The first focuses on individual liberty: by restraining the public’s ability to 
portray real people, publicity rights restrict an important form of meaning-
making.297  As Professor Michael Madow has argued, portrayals of real peo-
ple serve as “important expressive and communicative resources”298 that can 
enable individual meaning-making.  This is particularly true for portrayals of 
the socially prominent people more likely to sue to vindicate their publicity 
rights, for they often “symbolize individual aspirations, group identities, and 
cultural values.”299  To grant a censorship right or veto power to people who 
might be portrayed in expressive works is to deprive the public of a valuable 
means of self-determination and cultural influence.300 
This point leads to the second problematic dimension of publicity rights’ 
effect on cultural power: they entrench power with the powerful by facilitat-
ing “private censorship of popular culture.”301  In so doing, they imperil what 
Balkin has dubbed a “participatory culture”—one that is “democratic in the 
sense that everyone—not just political, economic, or cultural elites—has a 
fair chance to participate in the production of culture, and in the development 
of the ideas and meanings that constitute them and the communities and sub-
communities to which they belong.”302  By privatizing and centralizing an 
                                                          
 297.  See Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 132, at 1, 34; Madow, 
supra note 29, at 134. 
 298.  Madow, supra note 29, at 128. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  For an example of how this affects the creation of expressive works, consider again Spahn 
v. Julian Messner, Inc., where Warren Spahn sued over his portrayal in a fictional book directed at 
a juvenile audience.  The appeals court in that case acknowledged that the author had “urged and, 
perhaps, proved, that juvenile biography requires the fillip of dramatization, imagined dialogue, 
manipulated chronologies, and fictionalization of events.”  Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 260 
N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 221 N.E. 2d 543 (N.Y. 1966), vacated sub nom. Julian 
Messner, Inc. v. Spahn., 387 U.S. 239 (1967).  But this proof did not do the author any good; as the 
court explained, even assuming this proof, the result was simply that “the publication of juvenile 
biographies of living persons, even if public figures, may only be effected with the written consent 
of such persons.”  Id.  The author had argued that public figures would use such a consent-based 
system “as a lever for obtaining a price for” consent.  Id.  But again, the court was unmoved, holding 
that “[t]he consent and the price can be avoided by writing strictly factual biographies or by confin-
ing unauthorized biographies to those of deceased historic persons.”  Id. 
 301.  Madow, supra note 29, at 138.  
 302.  Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 132, at 3–4, 33.  Balkin’s work 
builds on the work of Professor John Fiske, whose idea of “semiotic democracy” illuminates the 
importance of popular participation in culture.  JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236, 239 (1987).  
Balkin is not the first to channel Fiske’s work—a host of scholars have advocated that intellectual-
property law should promote popular access and participation in cultural discourse.  See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
9–10 (2001); Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Poli-
tics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365 (1992); Rosemary J. Coombe, 
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important form of cultural power, the right of publicity exacerbates the trend 
of top-down management of popular culture by powerful figures in the cul-
ture industries, at the expense of marginalized and subordinated groups. 
Trump’s claims against Gore and Miller strike at the heart of why the 
First Amendment should protect participation in public discourse.  Both the 
song and the painting serve as mediums for the communication of ideas and 
opinions.  That alone entitles them to a strong presumption of protection.  But 
before we can be sure that Trump’s claims should fail, we need to analyze 
whether any of the interests served by publicity rights are of the kind that 
may restrict public discourse. 
B. Protecting Public Discourse 
In order to decide on the right framework, it is essential to scrutinize 
both the interests that publicity rights purport to serve and the values fur-
thered by the First Amendment.  As we will see, some frameworks proposed 
by courts and scholars leave room for consideration of certain interests but 
not others.  Though public discourse enjoys a strong presumption of protec-
tion against restriction, there are times when protection of particular interests 
is permissible within public discourse.303 
Publicity rights have been said to serve both public and individual inter-
ests.  The main public interest advanced to justify publicity rights is that they 
create incentives for people to act in ways that ultimately advance public 
welfare.  This incentives rationale draws on analogies to protection for cop-
yright and patents and relies on the premise that people will be more likely 
to invest the time and energy to develop their talents if they are financially 
rewarded in the form of an economic legal right.304  The corollary individual 
interest is the labor-reward rationale, which seeks to justify publicity rights 
on the ground that they reward labor and prevent unjust enrichment caused 
by freeloading.305 
                                                          
Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 
69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration: Mass 
Culture, Gender Identity, and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221 (1992); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Ap-
proach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 272–73 (1996); Wil-
liam W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998); 
Kenneth Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1, 27 (2000); 
David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in 
the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992); David Lange, Reimagining 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 475–83 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public 
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil 
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347–65 & n.310 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy 
and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000). 
 303.  See Post, supra note 35, at 1009. 
 304.  See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
 305.  See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 105–10 (summarizing arguments made by others). 
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Although these rationales have some intuitive appeal, they must be con-
strued narrowly to avoid absurd results.  All sorts of unauthorized uses that 
should enjoy First Amendment protection will remove some incentives for 
people to act in ways that might ultimately benefit the public.  Take the ex-
ample of Mark Zuckerberg’s portrayal in the Social Network, a movie pro-
duced by Aaron Sorkin that tells the story of Facebook’s early years.306  The 
movie’s creation removes some incentives for Zuckerberg to make a similar 
expressive work that tells the story from his perspective, but that alone cannot 
be sufficient to grant him a veto power simply because he was portrayed in 
Sorkin’s rendition.  Yet that is precisely what the right of publicity could 
allow if these rationales are loosely applied within public discourse. 
The Supreme Court’s only experience with the right of publicity pro-
vides guidance for how to construe these rationales narrowly to avoid First 
Amendment concerns.  In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,307 
Mr. Zacchini, a “human cannonball” performer, did his stunt at a local fair.308  
After a news station filmed and televised his entire act, he claimed his right 
of publicity had been violated.309  The state supreme court blocked the claim 
and granted the news station First Amendment protection for its broadcast, 
but the Court reversed.  Although plaintiffs may wish to construe Zacchini 
broadly as protecting a robust right of publicity even in the context of public 
discourse, a careful reading of the decision suggests otherwise.  The Court 
emphasized that Zacchini’s “performance” and the news clip both lasted fif-
teen seconds, meaning that the broadcast showed his “entire performance.”310  
This emphasis could support a pair of related restrictions that limit the labor-
reward and incentives rationales to performances that are reproduced in their 
entirety.311  We might combine these restrictions into the single rule that pub-
licity rights may restrict public discourse when the unauthorized use of some-
one’s likeness is substitutive.312 
To understand what this might mean in the context of expressive works, 
we can learn a lot from Zacchini itself.  On multiple occasions, the Court 
drew a distinction between reproduction of Zacchini’s performance and other 
uses of a person’s name or likeness.  For instance, the Court explicitly noted 
that Zacchini’s case was “more limited” than other publicity claims that 
“merely assert . . . some general use” of a person’s name or likeness.313  The 
                                                          
 306.  THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Relativity Media 2010). 
 307.  433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 308.  Id. at 563. 
 309.  Id. at 563–64. 
 310.  Id. at 564. 
 311.  The Court’s short opinion refers to Zacchini’s “performance” sixteen times above the line, 
and the word “entire” modifies it (or a synonym for it) twelve of those times.  See id. at 563–79. 
 312.  Cf. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing the 
idea of “substitutive competition” and “substitutive value” in copyright law). 
 313.  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 n.10. 
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Court then described Zacchini’s claim as “much narrower” because it con-
cerned “an entire act that he ordinarily gets paid to perform.”314  This strongly 
suggests that the First Amendment provides less protection to rebroadcast a 
performance than other cases of unauthorized use of a person’s name or like-
ness.  It would be a “very different case,” the Court explained, if the news 
station “had merely reported” and “described” Zacchini’s performance, even 
if it had also shown his picture.315  In dicta, the Court confidently asserted 
that it was “evident” that the right of publicity would not prevent someone 
from “reporting” facts about Zacchini’s act.316  Professor Eugene Volokh has 
made a similar point, noting that the Court “twice stressed that it was not 
deciding the broader question of when a plaintiff may sue the defendant for 
using plaintiff’s name, likeness, or other attributes of identity.”317  Indeed, as 
Patrick Kabat has quipped, the Court’s repeated emphasis on the fact that 
Zacchini’s claim was about “performance, not likeness” suggests that the de-
cision “would have been the same if he had launched a pig, rather than him-
self, from the canon.”318 
The Court also implied that it was significant that the news clip showed 
Zacchini’s “entire performance,” and not merely a snippet of it.319  Because 
viewing the act on the evening news served as a substitute for viewing it in 
person—and paying for the privilege—Zacchini’s claim presented different 
First Amendment stakes.  Although the Court’s dicta did not elaborate on 
precisely how the outcome would differ, the opinion strongly suggests that 
only a narrow publicity claim could survive constitutional scrutiny in the con-
text of public discourse.  The Court not only framed the interest served by 
the right of publicity as a “proprietary interest of the individual in his act,” 
but it also spoke in general terms when declaring that, in publicity cases, “the 
only question is who gets to do the publishing.”320  Zacchini, the Court 
stressed, sought no injunction and requested only compensation for the 
broadcasting of his entire act.321  This suggests that only cases involving sub-
stitutive uses of a likeness—that is, cases where more than one actor could 
                                                          
 314.  Id.; see also id. at 574 (distinguishing between using someone’s name or likeness in “the 
reporting of events” from “an attempt to broadcast or publish an entire act for which the performer 
ordinarily gets paid”). 
 315.  Id. at 569. 
 316.  Id. at 574; see also id. at 576 (“[T]he broadcast of petitioner’s entire performance, unlike 
the unauthorized use of another’s name for purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or 
picture by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”). 
 317.  Volokh, supra note 32, at 906. 
 318.  PATRICK KABAT, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: THROUGH THE THICKET? 11 (2015), 
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/deans-office/files/Kernochan/14.pdf. 
 319.  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576–77 (emphasis added). 
 320.  Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
 321.  Id. at 573–74.  
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“do the publishing”—fall within the scope of permissible limitations of pub-
lic discourse under Zacchini.322 
This particular limitation can be squared with the premises of public 
discourse for two reasons.323  First, by insisting that Zacchini’s requested re-
lief was in no way censorial, the Court indicated that his claim would not 
actually prevent the news station from broadcasting his performance.  The 
Court felt it was “important to note” that the news station would not “be de-
prived of the benefit” of rebroadcasting Zacchini’s performance “as long as 
his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized.”324  This framing 
honors the speaker’s right to reproduce a performance, albeit at a price.325  
Although we might usually worry about having to pay for the privilege of 
participating in public discourse, the Court concluded that the right to com-
pensation—but not the right to censor—was a fair constitutional compromise 
when the speech in question was a substitutive reproduction of an “entire 
performance.”326 
The second reason that Zacchini’s narrow rule is consistent with the 
premises of public discourse is that its logic is grounded in protecting and 
encouraging other constitutionally protected expression.  The Court high-
lighted that narrow claims concerning a performance like Zacchini’s “en-
courage such entertainment”327 and provide the “economic incentive” neces-
sary for performers “to make the investment required to produce a 
performance of interest to the public.”328  The Court appeared comfortable 
with Zacchini’s claim only because broadcasting his “entire act pose[d] a 
substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.”329  Although 
the Court was a little vague on what constituted a “substantial threat” in this 
context, it did explain that “[t]he effect of a public broadcast of the perfor-
mance is similar to preventing [Zacchini] from charging an admission fee” 
and “goes to the heart of [his] ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”330  In 
                                                          
 322.  Id. 
 323.  I have some doubts about the Court’s wisdom in concluding that viewing Zacchini’s per-
formance on the nightly news is substitutive for seeing it in person.  It seems to me that there are 
many reasons why seeing it live—when the suspense created by this daredevil stunt would surely 
be higher—would be a quite different experience.  But Zacchini is binding law, at least for now. 
 324.  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578. 
 325.  See id. (emphasizing that Zacchini “d[id] not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his perfor-
mance; he simply want[ed] to be paid for it”). 
 326.  Id. at 576. 
 327.  Id. at 573. 
 328.  Id. at 576.  In one significant passage, the Court analogized claims like Zacchini’s to claims 
under copyright law.  The Court explained that copyright protections are intended “to afford greater 
encouragement to the production of works of benefit to the public,” and the First Amendment “does 
not prevent [states] from making a similar choice . . . to protect the entertainer’s incentive in order 
to encourage the production of this type of work.”  Id. at 577 (quoting Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. 
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)). 
 329.  Id. at 575. 
 330.  Id. at 575–76. 
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other words, the Court concluded that televising the performance without 
compensating Zacchini was equivalent to depriving him of the entire eco-
nomic value of his live performance. 
This presents a high bar for plaintiffs to meet.  In order to restrict public 
discourse, a plaintiff would have to show that the unauthorized broadcast of 
a performance would pose a substantial threat to the performer’s ability to do 
his performance.  The Court demanded more than an abstract threat, insisting 
that Zacchini prove on remand that the broadcast actually caused him to suf-
fer an economic loss.  If, for example, the “broadcast increased the value of 
[Zacchini’s] performance by stimulating the public’s interest in seeing the act 
live,” the Court concluded that Zacchini “would not be able to prove damages 
and thus would not recover.”331  Zacchini had alleged that the broadcast 
caused him $25,000 in damages, and the Court conditionally approved “com-
pensation of this injury if proved.”332 
Read as a whole, Zacchini circumscribes the role that the labor-reward 
and incentives rationales can play in justifying publicity claims that would 
interfere with public discourse.  When a use of someone’s name or likeness 
is substitutive, it seems fair to presume that an uncompensated replication 
will both remove incentives and create injustice when the one who worked 
to create the value is left penniless and someone else gets paid.  Under these 
narrow circumstances, allowing compensation upon proof of economic loss 
can be compatible with robust protection of public discourse.  But the same 
cannot be said for non-substitutive uses.  Even assuming a person has a moral 
claim to reap some rewards from her labor, that claim cannot justify hoarding 
all of the rewards that publicity rights would give them.  Other actors con-
tributed labor that created the identity’s value, including consumers and the 
media.333  In sum, publicity claims premised on the labor-reward and incen-
tives rationales cannot survive constitutional challenges unless the unauthor-
ized portrayal is substitutive and both actually and substantially threatens a 
performer’s ability to perform.334 
                                                          
 331.  Id. at 575 n.12. 
 332.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 333.  See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 105–10; Madow, supra note 29, at 182–84 . 
 334.  Narrowing the incentives rationale in this way is also responsive to two common critiques 
of a broad construction of the rationale.  First, scholars have attacked the incentives rationale on the 
basis that plenty of adequate incentives already exist to achieve fame, such that publicity rights offer 
no meaningful enhancement.  See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 101–02.  Second, scholars have 
observed that, to the extent that the incentive rationale ultimately rests on enriching public welfare, 
we must also factor in the considerable costs to the public brought about by speech restrictions 
imposed by publicity rights.  See, e.g., id. 
Law-and-economics scholars have advanced a similar public interest based on the idea that 
publicity rights efficiently maximize wealth and allocate resources in ways that ultimately benefit 
the public.  See supra note 41.  This efficiency rationale depends on an assumption that unauthorized 
portrayals in expressive works will decrease the commercial value of a person’s name or likeness—
an assumption that the Court rejected in Zacchini.  Like a broadly construed incentives rationale, 
the efficiency rationale falls apart on closer inspection.  See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 32, at 911 
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Other scholars have argued that publicity rights can serve individual in-
terests by redressing dignitary injuries to a person’s autonomy, liberty, and 
privacy.335  Depending on the context, the dignity rationale can also be un-
derstood to vindicate public interests, such as when publicity rights provide 
a remedy for false product endorsements that deceive consumers and simul-
taneously inflict dignitary injuries on the person falsely associated with the 
product.336  To understand how this rationale interacts with public discourse, 
we must be specific about how any particular unauthorized use harms dignity 
and develop some normative conception of what dignitary harms are cog-
nizable in this context.  There are all kinds of expressive uses of a person’s 
name or likeness that could be said to harm dignity—perhaps a person simply 
does not like the actress picked to play them, or they do not like how an artist 
drew their nose or hair—and it would severely curtail public discourse if all 
of these uses triggered liability.337 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly blocked claims that seek to redressed 
dignitary harms caused by public discourse.338  As Justice O’Connor wrote 
in Boos v. Barry,339 the Court’s constitutional doctrine furnishes the rule “that 
in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outra-
geous, speech in order to provide ‘adequate “breathing space” to the free-
doms protected by the First Amendment.’”340  This rule, as Post has observed, 
“essentially immunizes public discourse from the legal imposition of com-
munity norms of decency and respect,”341 but it is subject to “the paradox of 
                                                          
n.32.  Many of the empirical claims that underlie it are simply unknowable.  For example, unau-
thorized portrayals do sometimes enhance the value of someone’s identity, but it’s impossible to 
know in advance which portrayals do or don’t or to objectively measure “the value of someone’s 
identity.”  We also should not presume (as the efficiency rationale does) that any person deserves 
the entire value of her identity, nor can we know (and indeed we might doubt) that vesting a right 
of portrayal in one person instead of the public actually enhances the overall public welfare.  See 
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 100–05. 
 335.  See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 111–12; Kwall, supra note 44, at 158–59. 
 336.  McKenna, supra note 45, at 225; Lemley, supra note 10, at 1163–64. 
 337.  See Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 213 P.3d 132, 134 (Cal. 2009); Lemley, supra note 10, 
at 1163 (“The private citizen who finds himself on the side of a coffee can as the face of instant 
coffee, for instance, may have lost control over his destiny in some meaningful way that the law 
probably should care about.”).  But see Lemley, supra note 10, at 1165 (worrying that the same 
dignity rationale might preclude portrayals of the neo-Nazis in Charlottesville or the police who 
have murdered black Americans). 
 338.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Fal-
well, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
 339.  485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 340.  Id. at 322 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 
56). 
 341.  Post, supra note 295, at 1276; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 51; Cohen v. 
California 403 U.S. 15, 22–23 (1971); Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The 
Legal Constitution of Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV 173–74 (John 
W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds. 1993). 
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public discourse”—a term Post has coined to capture the idea that public dis-
course can perform its constitutional function “only if it is conducted with a 
modicum of civility.”342  Although enforcing civility rules may constrain free 
speech, people are unlikely to experience public discourse as a medium 
through which they may influence the construction of public opinion if it be-
comes sufficiently abusive and alienating.343  Under sufficiently uncivil con-
ditions, public discourse will no longer foster the sense of legitimacy and 
participation, and thus the justification for protecting it will diminish.344 
The paradox of public discourse gives us guidance on the limits that the 
First Amendment should place on publicity claims that seek to remedy dig-
nitary harms.  The Court has made clear that state torts like the right of pub-
licity “can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and 
“must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”345  Cur-
rent constitutional doctrine means that many dignitary harms caused by 
speech in public discourse are not cognizable.  This doctrine does not deny 
that speech in public discourse can cause severe harms to dignity; rather, it 
reflects the judgment that the First Amendment must protect forms of speech 
despite the harm that they cause.  As Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court 
in Snyder v. Phelps346: 
Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to tears 
of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.  On 
the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the 
speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to pro-
tect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not 
stifle public debate.347 
Nevertheless, the Court has allowed certain types of dignitary harms to 
be redressed by state torts despite the fact that the harms stemmed from 
speech in public discourse.  Defamation and false light provide two exam-
ples.  Faced with claims that false or misleading speech in public discourse 
caused someone harm, the Court has crafted constitutional rules that recog-
nize robust First Amendment rights while still allowing people to obtain a 
remedy if they make certain evidentiary showings.348 
This solicitude for only certain types of dignitary claims reflects a deep 
tension within constitutional doctrine.  Post’s “paradox” captures the trou-
bling notion that the First Amendment “suspends legal enforcement of the 
                                                          
 342.  Post, supra note 35, at 1009. 
 343.  Id. 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).  
 346.  562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
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very civility rules that make rational deliberation possible.”349  This tension, 
according to Professor Lawrence Lessig, “cannot be avoided,” for “public 
discourse must ‘blunt’ rules of civility if it is to assure a critical space within 
which reflection about community life can occur,” and “[y]et if it blunts these 
rules of civility too much, it will undercut the very community that it criti-
cizes.”350  This has led Post and others to conclude that public discourse can 
perform its constitutional function only if people conduct it with a “modi-
cum” of civility.351  Quite what this “modicum” covers is contestable, but 
“legal regulation to enforce community standards of civility may be required 
as an unfortunate but necessary option of last resort” if the breakdown of civil 
discourse is sufficiently extreme.352  In these circumstances, publicity claims 
seeking to redress dignitary harms might still be compatible with protection 
of public discourse. 
C. Hard Cases 
If publicity doctrine were reframed in the way I have suggested, how 
might courts handle the thorniest publicity-related issues of the day?  It is 
difficult to map out hypotheticals precisely, but this Section considers how 
several new technologies might pose novel challenges to the doctrine.  It first 
considers four speaker-focused approaches that courts and legislatures have 
used to curb publicity rights due to concerns about free speech.  All of these 
approaches would serve speakers’ interests better than the listener-focused 
defenses that currently rule the roost, but none are satisfactory because they 
either over-protect or under-protect speech interests.  This Section then con-
cludes by sketching out preliminary thoughts about how courts should ap-
proach some of the pressing disputes that are, or soon will be, before them. 
In recent years, innovation surrounding the simulation of human like-
ness has advanced at a rapid speed.353  So too has our ability to post and 
spread videos and images online.  These new technologies enable the wide-
spread creation and dissemination of “audio and video of real people saying 
and doing things they never said or did.”354  These so-called “deep fakes” 
                                                          
 349.  Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 267, 287 (1991). 
 350.  Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1422, 1440 (1996). 
 351.  Post, supra note 35, at 1009. 
 352.  Post, supra note 349, at 287 (giving the example of “fighting words” as the “paradigmatic 
example” of this extreme condition). 
 353.  Professors Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron have written a path-breaking article on this 
topic, shedding light on how “deep fake” technology can lead to an array of harms to individuals 
and society.  See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, 
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3213954##. 
 354.  Id. (manuscript at 1). 
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have featured near-perfect simulations of various celebrities’ faces trans-
posed onto the bodies of actresses in pornographic movies, among other 
things.355  The technology is so widely available, there is no reason why these 
uses will be limited to celebrities; any stilted ex-lover could retaliate against 
a former partner by creating and spreading such a video on the internet.  To 
make matters worse, advances in the field of virtual reality have the potential 
to transform deep fakes into a fully immersive experience.356 In a related 
vein, the proliferation of “nonconsensual pornography” or “revenge porn”—
terms used to describe the “distribution of sexually graphic images of indi-
viduals without their consent”—is a problem of growing concern, particu-
larly for women who are the overwhelming targets of such abhorrent behav-
ior.357  A distinct set of challenges has arisen in response to developments in 
the world of sports and entertainment.  Hyper-realistic videogames have fea-
tured real-world celebrities,358 and the market has exploded for fantasy sports 
that allow the public to play online competitions between made-up teams 
filled with actual sports stars.359  Meanwhile, expressive works have increas-
ingly portrayed famous figures in fictional settings360 and featured deceased 
actors who have been “reanimated” to reprise their roles after death.361  
Lastly, the faces of cultural icons have appeared on dolls, busts, and other 
commemorative merchandise.362 
                                                          
 355.  Id. 
 356.  These “virtual” recreations need not be technologically sophisticated.  One could imagine 
a market for sex dolls that look like real people.  Cf. Jenna Moon & Claire Floody, North America’s 
First Known Sex Doll Brothel Opening in Toronto, THE STAR (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/08/26/north-americas-first-known-sex-doll-brothel-open-
ing-in-toronto.html (describing North America’s first “sex doll brothel” where clients can seek sex-
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 357.  Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).  These images can be obtained by the revenge pornographer both 
non-consensually, as when taken through hidden cameras or videos of sexual assault; or consensu-
ally, as when given by an intimate partner.  But in both scenarios, the publication and distribution 
are non-consensual, and are often done not just for voyeuristic or economic motivation but also with 
mal-intent for the depicted.  See id.  We owe a great debt to Professors Danielle Citron and Mary 
Anne Franks for their tireless and inspirational work on how the law might address the atrocity of 
nonconsensual pornography.  
 358.  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2013); No Doubt v. Activision 
Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011); Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 
551747, 2014 WL 5930149 at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014). 
 359.  See Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 884 F.3d 672, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 360.  See, e.g., Tonya Riley, The Dubious Ethics of “Real-Person Fiction,” DARK(ISH) WEB 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://medium.com/s/darkish-web/the-dubious-ethics-of-real-person-fiction-
5cd6bd498c16. 
 361.  See, e.g., Catherine Shoard, Peter Cushing Is Dead.  Rogue One’s Resurrection Is a Digital 
Indignity, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2016/dec/21/peter-cushing-rogue-one-resurrection-cgi. 
 362.  See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc. 
296 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. 1982). 
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All of these portrayals of real people raise complicated questions under 
publicity doctrine.  They all arguably occur in expressive works and thus 
should trigger some form of constitutional scrutiny to protect speakers’ rights 
to participate in public discourse.  One approach would be to immunize all 
these works under a blanket rule that publicity rights can never inhibit por-
trayals of real people in expressive works.  Under this approach, the right of 
publicity would remain a viable claim to challenge unauthorized portrayals 
in commercial speech, but all portrayals in public discourse would be fully 
protected.  Some states already guarantee statutory protection to this effect 
by providing an exemption to the right of publicity if the portrayal of a real 
person is part of an expressive work.363  Courts in other states have offered 
similar carve-outs through statutory construction of publicity tort ele-
ments.364  This sweeping approach has the advantage of leaving less uncer-
tainty for creators of expressive works whose speech might otherwise be 
chilled, but it has the disadvantage of leaving no room for consideration of 
competing interests advanced by the right of publicity.  This inflexibility is 
troubling when new technologies threaten novel harms that publicity rights 
might vindicate.  Consider the example of nonconsensual pornography.  
These films and photographs might often qualify as expressive works that are 
part of public discourse,365 meaning that they would be immune from public-
ity claims under this regime.  Although categorical protection would be a 
boon to creators of expressive works, it might ultimately undermine the 
premises of public discourse if it shields uses of a person’s likeness that are 
substitutive or inflict severe dignitary harms. 
A second approach would be to allow publicity rights to prevail against 
expressive works only if they are likely to deceive the public in some legally 
cognizable way.  Some courts have adopted the standard from Rogers v. Gri-
maldi,366 which permits publicity claims to prevail only if the expressive 
work is actually a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods 
or services.367  This approach, which has roots in trademark law, essentially 
serves to double check if commercial speech is masquerading as an expres-
sive work to gain constitutional protection.  Courts first ask if the portrayal 
is part of an expressive work; if it is, the court then considers whether the 
                                                          
 363.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-761(H)(1) (2017). 
 364.  See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802, 810 (Fla. 2005) (holding 
that Florida’s statutory right of publicity doesn’t apply to expressive works because the statute’s use 
of “the term ‘commercial purpose’ . . . does not apply to publications, including motion pictures, 
which do not directly promote a product or service”). 
 365.  I see many troubles with this conclusion, but it seems difficult to escape it given the con-
stitutional treatment of film and photography as presumptively protected media for the communi-
cation of ideas.  See Post, supra note 295, at 1253.  An important caveat might be that nonconsensual 
pornography that is also obtained non-consensually would not be part of public discourse even if 
the person who took the video or photograph shared it publicly.  See supra note 357. 
 366.  875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 367.  Id. at 1004–05. 
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portrayal is “wholly unrelated” to the expressive work (that is, if it has “no 
artistic relevance” whatsoever to the underlying work) and whether the ex-
pressive work is merely a “disguised commercial advertisement” that explic-
itly deceives the public by affirmatively claiming sponsorship or endorse-
ment.368  The main advantage of the Rogers test is that it would offer robust 
protection for public discourse.  In practice, it has proven to be a speech-
protective standard because it effectively recognizes only one of the interests 
purportedly served by the right of publicity—likelihood of consumer confu-
sion that the plaintiff has endorsed a product or service.  But that feature is 
also its bug.  To its detriment, the Rogers test is inflexible in recognizing 
other interests that publicity rights might serve, especially those triggered by 
new technologies that inflict harms that have nothing to do with consumer 
confusion.  Take the example of the dignitary harms caused by expressive 
works like deep fakes that feature real people’s faces transposed onto videos 
and photos, many of which are pornographic.  The harm wrought by these 
expressive works is not simply that a viewer might be deceived into believing 
that they are watching a video that actually portrays the subject (although, 
that harm may also exist).  Rather, it is the dignitary harm inflicted on the 
subject herself.  If, for example, the deep fake featured a disclaimer that in-
formed the viewer that the famous actress being depicted had not actually 
been filmed performing a sexual act, the deception-based claim would fail 
but a harm to her dignity would remain.  The Rogers test, however, would 
offer no relief. 
Perhaps the most commonly used—and yet most commonly criti-
cized—way to reconcile the First Amendment with publicity rights is the 
transformative-use test.369  This test offers protection for expressive works 
that sufficiently “transform[]” a person’s name or likeness.370  In Winter v. 
DC Comics,371 for example, the California Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment protected a comic book featuring two “villainous half-worm, 
half-human offspring” named Johnny and Edgar Autumn (based on the sib-
ling rock duo Johnny and Edgar Winter).372  Similarly, in Kirby v. Sega of 
America, Inc.,373 the California Court of Appeals blocked a publicity claim 
brought against the creators of a videogame starring an avatar based on singer 
Kierin Kirby because the avatar was “fanciful” and appeared “in outer space 
                                                          
 368.  See id. at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 
(Cal. 1979) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., concurring)); E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 
F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 369.  See generally Kadri, supra note 27 (critiquing the test). 
 370.  See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001) 
(asking whether the expressive work added significant creative elements “so as to be transformed 
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation”). 
 371.  69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
 372.  Id. at 476. 
 373.  50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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in the 25th Century.”374  This might sound promising for creators of expres-
sive works, but these speech-protective decisions are outliers under the trans-
formative-use test, which has more often resulted in expressive works being 
penalized—especially when the works feature realistic depictions, unlike 
those in Winter and Kirby.375  In a pair of cases brought by college athletes 
against the makers of a videogame, two courts concluded that the works were 
not sufficiently “transformative” because the avatars were so realistic, the 
statistics in the game were historically accurate, and the athletes were asso-
ciated with their actual colleges in their actual stadiums.376  The First Amend-
ment offered no protection because the videogame “literally recreates” each 
player “in the very setting in which he has achieved renown.”377  The trans-
formative-use test is beset by flaws, many of which I have addressed else-
where,378 but the chief concern for our purposes is that forcing creators of 
expressive works to refrain from using realism is incompatible with the right 
to participate in public discourse.  Many expressive works that depend on 
realistic portrayals—docudramas, biopics, biographies, documentaries, and 
portraits—would be vulnerable if the constitutional barometer required trans-
formation to diverge from reality.  The First Amendment should not be inter-
preted in such a manner if it is to foster cultural participation through public 
discourse. 
Finally, courts might apply strict scrutiny to publicity claims that chal-
lenge portrayals of real people in expressive works.  At least one prominent 
court has done so in assessing whether such a publicity claim was consistent 
with the First Amendment.  In Sarver v. Chartier,379 the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target speech based on its 
communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be jus-
tified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve 
compelling state interests.”380  Applying that standard to a publicity claim 
brought against the makers of a movie based on a true story, the court noted 
that California’s right of publicity “clearly restricts speech based upon its 
content” and held that the plaintiff showed no compelling interest in prevent-
ing his portrayal in the expressive work.381  Strict scrutiny has the advantage 
                                                          
 374.  Id. at 609–10, 618. 
 375.  See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licens-
ing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); No 
Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 376.  Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276–79; Hart, 717 F.3d at 166, 169. 
 377.  Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (“The digital Ryan Hart does what 
the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football . . . .  This is not transforma-
tive.”).  
 378.  See Kadri, supra note 27. 
 379.  813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 380.  Id. at 903 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)). 
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of allowing courts to inspect on a case-by-case basis the particular interests 
that publicity rights might serve and to demand that the publicity-based rem-
edy is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.382  This flexibility is advanta-
geous as courts are called to respond to emerging technologies that create 
novel harms.  But there are two serious disadvantages to this approach.  First, 
it retains much of the uncertainty that currently plagues this area of the law 
because it is tough to predict in advance which interests courts will find com-
pelling and narrowly addressed in any given case.  Second, and relatedly, the 
standard itself does not inherently curtail the long list of interests that public-
ity rights purportedly serve and yet fail to withstand serious scrutiny.  As a 
result, there is no guarantee that the interests that a court will find compelling 
are responsive to the premises of public discourse. 
Returning to our earlier discussion, I have argued that there are only two 
interests served by publicity rights that can be compatible with adequate pro-
tection for public discourse.  The first—a modified incentives rationale—
protects the interest in being compensated for substitutive portrayals that ac-
tually and substantially threaten a person’s ability to engage in other forms 
of expression.383  The second—a modified dignitary rationale—recognizes 
the interest in redressing portrayals that inflict extreme dignitary harms that 
are sufficiently abusive and alienating to warrant legal intervention.384  These 
are, to be sure, nuanced and delicate concepts for courts to apply, and they 
will not provide creators of expressive works with perfect ex-ante notice as 
to their potential liability.  But that is sometimes the nature of constitutional 
analysis, particularly when strong competing interests clash.  The First 
Amendment protects robust rights to participate in public discourse, but the 
state can also furnish individuals with rights under tort law that serve narrow 
interests compatible with protection for public discourse.  As we have seen, 
publicity rights have often been interpreted broadly and in ways that curtail 
speakers’ abilities to portray real people in expressive works, but it would be 
unwise to swing too far in the opposite direction and conclude that the right 
of publicity is unequivocally unconstitutional within this realm.  For one 
thing, Zacchini teaches us that certain publicity claims are compatible with 
the First Amendment’s protection of public discourse—the defendant that 
                                                          
or persona or seeks to capitalize off a celebrity’s image in commercial advertisements.”  Id. at 905.  
Because the plaintiff hadn’t made “the investment required to produce a performance of interest to 
the public,” he couldn’t establish a compelling interest.  Id. (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)). 
 382.  See Frazier v. Boomsma, No. CV07-08040-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 2808559, at *11–*19 
(D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007) (applying strict scrutiny to block publicity claims brought against an ac-
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 383.  See supra Section III.B. 
 384.  See id. 
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was found liable in that case was, after all, a news organization that was re-
porting current events to the public.385  For another, although legal recourse 
for violations of civility norms is rarely permissible within public discourse, 
there are some dignitary harms caused by uncivil speech that have withstood 
constitutional scrutiny.386 
Appreciating these two interests can help courts address some of today’s 
most challenging legal questions raised by portrayals of real people.  It is 
impossible to resolve all of these questions in the abstract, but it is nonethe-
less useful to make some general observations about how publicity rights 
might interact with the First Amendment in some of the harder cases fore-
shadowed above: deep fakes, nonconsensual pornography, virtual reality, 
videogames, fantasy sports, fictional works, digital reanimation, and com-
memorative merchandise.  It seems unlikely that the modified incentives ra-
tionale will justify many publicity claims raised by these uses of someone’s 
name or likeness because they are not substitutive.  In a deep fake or revenge 
porn video, for example, a woman suing because her nonconsensual appear-
ance in a pornographic film causes her emotional distress is not seeking com-
pensation because the video threatens her ability to profit from a similar ex-
pressive work.387  Similarly, when a person’s name or likeness is used in 
videogames, fantasy sports, or fictional works, it is farfetched to say that the 
use serves as a substitute for other expression by that person.  The creators of 
the Grand Theft Auto videogame, for example, did not threaten Lindsay Lo-
han’s acting career by including an avatar that arguably invoked her image.388  
The incentives rationale might someday be important if digital reanimation 
becomes a substitute for real actors and musicians.  A performer recreated 
into a life-like and look-alike avatar might be able to make a showing that the 
portrayal is substitutive, but it would still appear to be a high hurdle to clear 
given Zacchini’s insistence that plaintiffs relying on this rationale show ac-
tual damages caused by the portrayal.389 
The modified dignitary rationale might be more responsive to some of 
the harms created by new technologies.  Nonconsensual pornography—
whether created artificially as in deep fakes or shared without permission as 
in revenge porn—might represent such an extreme violation of civility norms 
that legal recourse would still be consistent with the First Amendment.  It is, 
admittedly, difficult to cabin the scope of these dignitary interests, but many 
of these unauthorized portrayals create abusive and alienating conditions that 
                                                          
 385.  See Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562. 
 386.  See supra notes 338–352 and accompanying text. 
 387.  An interesting exception to this general point might be pornographic actors portrayed in 
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 388.  See Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 389, 392 (N.Y. 2018). 
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threaten the premises of protection for public discourse.390  Many, however, 
will not—and it is important to consider them when drawing constitutional 
lines.  We have already seen many ways that deep fakes can create laudable, 
pro-social speech that should be shielded by the First Amendment.  Consider, 
for example, the enhancements this technology could bring in the realm of 
education.  In teaching about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, 
a deep fake could allow us to hear the speech he was due to give on the day 
of his death in his own voice, as one Scotland-based company has now 
done.391  Similarly, imagine the powerful artistic uses of deep fakes, similar 
to the digital manipulation in Forrest Gump where doctored video footage 
portrayed three past presidents meeting with the movie’s protagonist and say-
ing things they never said.392  Deep fakes can also spur valuable political 
speech, as when a Belgian political party created a deep fake depicting Pres-
ident Trump giving a fictional address where he says: “As you know I had 
the balls to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement.  And so should 
you.”393  Although Trump never used those words in abandoning the agree-
ment, the political party used this tool to “start a public debate” to “draw 
attention to the necessity to act on climate change.”394  All of these deep fakes 
deserve First Amendment protection as quintessential forms of public dis-
course.395 
                                                          
 390.  See Post, supra note 35, at 1009; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE 
L.J. 1870, 1921–24 (2019) (discussing an array of repugnant deep fakes and raising the awful spec-
ter of a deep fake featuring someone being raped).  Citron argued that the right of publicity “is 
inapplicable” in this context “because creators of deep-fake sex videos likely do not use people’s 
faces or bodies for a commercial advantage.”  Id. at 1939 n.461; see also Chesney & Citron, supra 
note 353 (manuscript at 16) (arguing that the right of publicity would be impotent against most deep 
fakes because, “[f]or better or worse, the commercial-gain element sharply limits the utility of this 
model: the harms associated with deep fakes do not typically generate direct financial gain for their 
creators”).  Although it is true that some courts have used concepts related to commerciality to cabin 
the reach of publicity rights, courts in many jurisdictions would likely include deep fakes within the 
tort’s potential scope so long as the portrayal gave the defendant some sort of advantage.  See Roth-
man, supra note 23, at 1950 (noting that, in some states, “any purpose or advantage” will suffice).  
To the extent that a state seeks to limit publicity liability to “commercial” uses, I agree with Citron 
(and Chesney) that some nonconsensual pornography might evade liability.  In my view, that would 
be a compelling reason to reform that state’s law to remove a commerciality requirement.  See 
Citron, supra, at 1951 (arguing that “[t]he privacy torts should evolve” to provide “robust protection 
of the ability to determine for oneself how much of one’s naked body, intimate information, or 
intimate activities are exposed to others”). 
 391.  John F Kennedy’s Lost ‘Last’ Speech Recreated, BBC (Mar. 16, 2018), 
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 394.  Id. (quoting the Flemish Socialist Party). 
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tional concept of public discourse.  For example, deep fakes can enhance autonomy and equality for 
 958 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:899 
Looking beyond deep fakes, the claims brought so far against creators 
of fantasy-sports games, videogames, and merchandise would struggle to 
meet the exacting standard under the modified dignitary rationale.  In my 
view, these unauthorized portrayals do not offend civility norms in the way 
that nonconsensual depiction and dissemination of sexual acts does.  The 
plaintiffs might wish to share in the profits generated by these media of ex-
pression, but their portrayals do not create the type of abusive and alienating 
conditions that undermine public discourse.396  Of course, these media could 
theoretically be used to inflict serious dignitary harms, and courts must be 
prepared to adapt to changing conditions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The time has come to curb the right of publicity and reframe the First 
Amendment justifications that face off against it.  When plaintiffs success-
fully use the right of publicity against expressive works, the tort censors—or 
at least ransoms—the portrayal of real people and threatens public discourse.  
Protection for expressive works that portray real people should not depend 
on their providing information to citizens in voting booths or politicians in 
legislative chambers.  Instead, this form of expression should presumptively 
be protected as a valuable part of the public’s participation in the “building 
of the whole culture.”397  By recalibrating the theoretical foundations of this 
debate, we can justify and explain speech protection for these works with 
greater confidence and coherence. 
This Article has illustrated a simple but important point: the theories we 
use to justify rights matter.  This realization is particularly crucial in First 
Amendment doctrine, which often operates categorically—a theory about 
what speech is protected is also a theory about what speech is unprotected.  
Educative theory has played an important role in protecting speech for many 
years, and it will surely continue to do so in certain cases.  But its limits are 
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apparent when it is raised as a shield for expressive works that portray real 
people.  This is because free speech is not merely about the “sweat and agony 
of the mind” of the meticulous voter,398 but also the role that expression plays 
in legitimating democratic power and influencing cultural power.  Through 
the idea of public discourse, we can better understand the values that should 
animate the doctrine—and, in so doing, be prepared to face the vexing ques-
tions that new technologies will surely compel us to answer. 
                                                          
 398.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 10. 
